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ABSTRACT
Unlike other Egypt’s provinces, terrorism in the Egypt’s North Sinai seems as sustained
terror with a wide base of extremist militant groups. The main objective of this study is to
answer the question of “why has terrorism escalated dramatically in Egypt’s North Sinai
province post 2011 and 2013?” After analyzing the literature on different causal explanation of
terrorism, it is found a shortage in terms of analyzing the nexus of ungovernability and
terrorism. Therefore, this study uses different concepts of ungovernability dimensions, relative
deprivation theory, and state repression concept to analyze them in relation to terrorism
escalation in the case study of Egypt’s North Sinai. The methodology of this study depends on
qualitative tools of analysis as well as statistical methods to analyze the terrorism phenomena
in North Sinai. Essentially, this study used empirical research methods through conducting
twenty in-depth interviews with various samples. Through analyzing this case study, it is found
that the ungovernability increases the opportunity of terror, especially in the case of selective
state penetration. For the sake of enriching the literature, this study provides an analytical
explanatory framework of the nexus between ungovernability dimensions and terrorism.
Finally, this study proposes four policy recommendations to reinforce the level of governability
in North Sinai province.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1.1: Background
Historically, the Sinai Peninsula was considered the center of conflict between Egypt
and Israel; these tensions subsided after the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979.
Immediately after the Egyptian revolution in 2011, North Sinai province has been witnessing an
escalated wave of terrorism by different extremist militant groups, particularly against the state
security establishments, state institutions, international forces, and infrastructure (Tuitel, 2013;
Said & Elkady, 2013, p.5). More than fifteen extremist militant groups were formed in North
Sinai (Siboni, G., & Barak, 2014, p. 6), among them the Sinai Province of the Islamic State
(SPIS) that is affiliated to the Islamic State group (IS) (“Ansar Beit al-Maqdis”, 2015).
Immediately, after the ousting of the Islamist President Mursi in July 2013, the level of terrorist
attacks in North Sinai has become severe (Dyer & Kessler, 2014, p. 5). Notably, terrorism is not
a new phenomenon in the Sinai Peninsula, where the peninsula witnessed the first wave of
terrorist attacks in 2004, 2005, and 2006 in South Sinai (Taba, Ras al-Shaitan, Nuweiba, Sharm
al-Sheikh, Dahab and near Egypt’s border with Eilat) by Al-Tawhid Wal Jihad terrorist group
that was established by the Bedouin dentist Khaled Massad. These terrorist attacks caused the
death of 130 individuals in total, and two other attacks with casualties at Multinational Forces
and Observers (MFO) in North Sinai (Pelham, 2012a, pp. 3-4; “Al Tawhid Wal Jihad” n.d.).
Basically, the academic literature regarding the causal explanations of terrorism
encompasses poverty, political repression, transitional democracy, relative deprivation, clash of
civilization, ungoverned space, and contagion theory. This study conducts an analytical review
8

of those causal explanations to analyze its relevance to the case study of North Sinai; and
accordingly the conceptual framework and methodology are demarcated.

1.2: Problem Statement
Since the 2011 revolution in Egypt, there have been a growing cycle and speedy
increase of terrorism in the northern Sinai. According to the Global Terrorism Index in 2014,
Egypt is ranked number 13 out of 124 with score 6.5/10 (Global Terrorism Index, 2014, pp. 89), which reflects the severity of terrorism as a phenomenon in Egypt. The terrorist attacks that
took place in Greater Cairo, Alexandria, Western Desert, Fayoum, Beni Suef, and Sharqia have
seen a decline, while terrorism in North Sinai is viewed as a sustained terror with large presence
of military base for the extremist militant groups (TIMEP, 2015j, p. 9). Figure 1 shows an
emergence of terrorism post 2011 revolution and severe escalation of terrorism post ousting the
Islamist President Mursi in July 2013. Moreover, this figure indicates that since October 2014,
there has been another wave of sustained escalating terrorism in North Sinai province.
In regard to the escalation of terrorism and considering North Sinai as a marginalized
borderland, the main research question is: “Why has terrorism escalated dramatically in
Egypt’s North Sinai province post 2011 and 2013? Does the ungovernability of this particular
space explain this increase as well as the difference in scale and scope of terrorism”?
Answering this question serves the study objective, which is to analyze terrorism escalation and
intensity in Egypt’s North Sinai province post 2011 and 2013. However, the academic literature
has various causal explanations of terrorism, but still there is a shortage in explaining the
process of how ungoverned spaces could produce terrorism. Therefore, this study aims at
exploring how the ungovernability dimensions could produce terrorism through tackling, in-
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depth, empirical investigation of Egypt’s North Sinai case study. Moreover, other sub-research
questions will be covered throughout this study to provide evidence-based findings, including:
 Why is there an escalation of terrorism in Egypt’s North Sinai and not with the same
intensity in other Egypt’s regions after the power transitions in 2011 and 2013?
 How does Egypt’s North Sinai match the ungovernability dimensions?
 How do the degree and nature of the state penetration into North Sinai society relate to
the terror in North Sinai?
 How does the interaction between the state penetration into society, relative deprivation
of population, and state repression in North Sinai province contribute to this terrorism
phenomenon in North Sinai province?
 How does the degree of the state monopoly on the use of force affect on the rise of
terror?
 How does the lack of state control over the borders between Sinai and Gaza contribute
to the terrorism in North Sinai?
 What kind of external interference in North Sinai has been occurring and how it has
been affecting on the nature and intensity of terror?

1.3: Study Significance
The significance of this study lies in enhancing the analytical explanatory framework of
the relationship between ungovernability dimensions and terrorism. This framework would
contribute to the academic literature from the point of understanding the dynamics of interaction
between these two variables. Moreover, it would help interpreting other cases; especially in the
Middle East region post the Arab Spring.
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1.4: Outline of the Study
This study is structured as flows; chapter one offers an introductory overview on the
topic through presenting the background, research problem, and study significance. Chapter two
analyzes the various causal explanations of terrorism, and points out the gap in the academic
literature. The methodology of this study encompasses the conceptual framework; methods of
data collection and analysis, and justification of selecting North Sinai as a case study are all
explained in chapter three. Chapter four offers a detailed and comprehensive analysis and
discussion of the case study. The findings from this study are summarized in Chapter five.
Based on findings; this study proposes four policy recommendations in chapter six. Chapter
seven provides the conclusion of this study and opens the floor for future research.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review on the Causal Explanation of Terrorism
The existing literature on terrorism has multiple explanations for its causes, including
poverty, regime type, relative deprivation, clash of civilization, ungoverned space, and
contagion theory.

2.1: Poverty Explanation
The poverty explanation is influenced by the modernization theory; it perceives that the
poverty and ignorance have a correlation with terrorism (Taspinar, 2009, pp. 1-2). Specifically,
the groups that are unsatisfied by the amount of wealth may use violence to increase their power
in the agenda-setting process (Schmid, 2011, p. 249). Ironically, other studies refuted this
argument, and claimed that most of the terrorists have a middle-class background. As an
illustration, in an impoverished country, a minority of well-off people may resort to the
terrorism as a tactic to enhance the country status (Hundley, 2011, p. 19; Piazza, 2009, pp. 406416; Krueger & Maleckova, 2002, pp. 1061-1062; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003, pp. 119-144).
Although, poverty exists in the case of North Sinai, but also many other Egypt’s regions
experience poverty and does not experience the same scale and scope of violence as in North
Sinai. Therefore, the poverty explanation might not be solely sufficient enough to justify the
terrorism phenomenon in North Sinai.

2.2: Regime Type Explanation
The regime type explanation of terrorism perceives that the democratic political system
provides a channel for popular participation, promotes the sense of tolerance in the political
system, establishes an inclusive and functional political system, increases the legitimacy of the
political system, which can reduce the frustration and alienation that may foster terrorism (Lia,
B. & Skolberg, 2004, pp. 34-25; Kaye, 2008, p. 163). Furthermore, promotion of political
12

freedoms can be a significant factor in reducing both domestic and ideological terrorism
(Bandyopadhyay & Younas, 2011, pp. 171-175; Lia, B. & Skolberg, 2004, pp. 25-39). The use
of terrorism and political violence becomes the only option to express the political grievances.
Another literature demonstrates that countries experience middle level of political freedom or
democratic transitions are those more likely to experience high level of terrorism. Specifically,
the liberal countries are less vulnerable to terrorism as they have more political freedom and
their governments enjoy an appropriate level of legitimacy. The authoritarian regime reduces
the opportunity to experience terrorist attacks as this regime can suppress those terrorists by
harsh security measures (Abadie, 2006, pp. 1-9; Lia and Skolberg, 2004, pp. 34-39, 71).
Accordingly, the regime type explanations offer little insight to explain the case of North Sinai.
Traditionally, more political grievance, leads to more terrorism. Therefore, the terror is less in
democratic setting than authoritarian ones, but evidence does not support that in all cases
(Hundley, 2011, pp. 19-20), and Egypt is not an exception. There were spikes of terror in 1980s
and 1990s in Egypt’s mainland (Awad & Hashem, 2015, p. 7), but there was neither change in
regime type nor political transition.

2.3: Cultural and Globalization Explanation
The cultural and globalization explanation perceives that most of the contemporary
terrorist organizations are based on religious ideologies. The competitive nature of globalization
creates a disparity, which in return increases the feeling of relative deprivation, foreign
occupation, and loss of identity. Consequently, this creates recruitment and violent acts against
globalization that are resulted in terrorism (Hundley, 2011, p. 20). The nexus between history,
identity and current reality of politics could explain the Jihadi terrorism (Githens-Mazer, 2008,
p. 27). Moreover, Samuel Huntington argues that the difference between cultures and religions
13

could explain terrorism today. The extremists use terrorism as a tool to produce changes in the
US policy in the Middle East. Radical Islam is conceived as the primary source of the clash of
civilization, and Al-Qaeda is an obvious example (Matusitz, 2013, pp. 12-14). Hence, this
explanation concentrates on explaining transnational terror that targets the West. Attacks on
Egypt’s Sinai could be explained in this frame only if US-Egypt cooperation and the EgyptianIsraeli Peace Treaty drive attacks. This treaty could explain why terror is concentrated in
Northern Sinai but not the rise in 2011 and 2013.

2.4: Multi-dimensional Framework Explanation
Other scholars argue that the causes of terrorism must be seen in a multi-dimensional
framework, which includes the socio-economic and political deprivation as a cause of terrorism.
Abject poverty might not be a condition for breeding terrorism, but instead when the negative
social, political and economic factors converge may cause radicalism and terrorism
phenomenon gets higher probability to ensue (Taspinar, 2009; Dias & Bravo, 2006, pp. 329341; Davis, 1999). Participating in collective violence is a relative deprivation situation that is
supported by political discrimination, exclusion, and injustice. This deprivation is not absolute
but relative to those excluded groups from the state apparatus, who might use violence as a
mean to revenge or change their economic and political status (Matusitz, 2013, pp. 15-16; Güre,
2009, pp. 1-24; Piazza, 2011, pp. 339-353; Piazza, 2012, pp. 521–546; Choi & Piazza, 2014, pp.
1-27; Cinar, 2010, pp. 56-57; Lia, B. & Skolberg, 2004). According to these theories, political
violence is a result of the gap between the perception on personal entailment and the reality of
objective realization (Schmid, 2011, p. 249). Given the known political and socio-economic
gaps between North Sinai and rest of Egypt’s regions, the relative depravation thesis has merit;
however, has not been systematically explored.
14

2.5: Contagion Theory Explanation
Contagion theory offers another explanation with some relevance to the case of
Northern Sinai on the grounds that it is the province in Egypt closest to the restive, Hamas ruled
Gaza Strip. The high levels of political violence in Gaza could be creating a spillover effect, or
groups in Sinai may be emulating those in Gaza (Lia & Skolberg, 2004, pp. 18, 77). In the
context of the Middle East post the Arab Spring, the regional dimension helped in transferring
the jihadi terrorism. For instance, two-third of SPIS group members, were fighters and extremist
in Syria (Bubalo, 2014, pp. 6-7). While there are many popular claims in support of contagion
theory as a justification for the rise in Sinai, contagion theory does not explain the timing.

2.6: Ungoverned Spaces Explanation
A final causal explanation of terrorism with relevance to North Sinai is the notion that
ungoverned spaces provide both grievance and opportunity for extremism to take hold.
Ungoverned spaces are not merely spaces deficient from governance; instead, they are spaces
where state control has been willingly or unwillingly yielded to or shared with actors not legally
recognized as sovereign authorities such as tribes or insurgents; hence, these spaces are
‘differently’ governed (Clunan & Trinkunas, 2010, pp. 17, 275). These spaces have social,
economic, and political dimensions in which the exercise of sovereignty is not effective and the
state authority and functions are absent, weak or contested (Clunan & Trinkunas, 2010, p.17;
Keister, 2014, p. 2; Swart, 2011, p. 44). These areas are mountains or deserts, sparsely
populated that suffer from a high degree of economic, and political marginalization. In these
spaces, people resort to illegal means to attain their living needs. The weakness of the state
ability to make population abide to the rule of law opens the door for clans and tribes to be the
main legitimate social, judicial, and political organizations, instead of being the state
15

institutions. Since these spaces are often located in remote or border areas, challenges for the
governability increase when there are difficulties in achieving cooperation with the neighboring
states or extending tribes on both sides of borders. The weakness of the state monopoly on the
use of force permits an external interference by an outside power to exploit this power vacuum
and exert some political and economic control over the space. This power can appear in the
presence of organized armed groups that could be represented in terrorists or insurgents, in
which they may contest the control of the government over a specific space. Moreover, these
groups use the border weakness to move, receive inputs and participate in illegal economic
activities such as trafficking, and recruitment of more people (Rabasa & Peters, 2007, pp. 7-13).
The state power should generate a system of rewards and punishment; any imbalance of
this system creates both a motivation and opportunity for terrorism (Hundley, 2011, p. 21).
Thus, ungoverned spaces provide a safe haven for terrorists for two main reasons. These spaces
introduce an opportunity for the extremist militant groups to exploit and use these spaces as a
strategic ground to launch international terrorist attacks (Taspinar, 2009, p. 82). Moreover, it is
a suitable training ground for recruitment of young uneducated and disadvantaged youth
(Taspinar, 2009, p. 82), or can be used as an operational base (Swart, 2011, p. 4). In the context
of Middle East region, the breakdown of the state control in different Arab regions post the
Arab Spring and the rise ungoverned spaces in the Arab states (such as Syria, Egypt’s Sinai,
Iraq, Libya, Yemen and parts of Lebanon) have opened the door for the terrorist groups to
emerge and expand their battlefield experience (Bubalo, 2014, pp. 6-7; Abdel-Fattah, 2015, p.
26; Alterman, 2014, p. 2).
Mainly, ‘state capacity’ and ‘state willingness’ to govern effectively the ungoverned
space, are the two determinants shaping the existence of ungoverned space. The capacity here
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comes when a state prioritizes its attention to other areas rather than that ungoverned space, and
this reflects the willingness determinant (Keister, 2014, pp. 1-17). This might relate to the case
of North Sinai that the state does not have the capacity to govern effectively, but only willing to
govern through coercion. Keister stated “Ungoverned spaces exist because integrating them
offers few benefits and may pose high costs to host regimes” (Keister, 2014, pp. 1-17). Two
main things can be understood from this explanation. First, the state initially does not extend its
capacity because the cost may be higher than the benefits. Second, the interference may cause
instability due to changing the status quo. This might be related to the case of North Sinai in
which the state was satisfied by status quo, and perceived that integrating the Bedouins of North
Sinai into society might generate insecurity for the state.
Rabasa and Peters argue that not all governed spaces produce terrorism, and they outline
four dimensions that are conducive to terrorism. First, existence of adequate infrastructure and
operation access that could be used by terrorist groups, including, communication facilities and
transportation networks. Second, existence of an environment that can provide a source of
income, unless the terrorist groups are able to bring funding from external sources. According
to the experiences of different ungoverned spaces (such as Pakistani-Afghan border, North
Caucasus, West Africa, Colombian-Venezuelan border, Sulawesi-Mindanao arc), the sources of
income that foster the terrorist activities are weapons, energy and drugs smuggling, human
trafficking, piracy, stolen vehicles, and other underground economic activities. Third, the
existence of favorable demographic and social characteristics such as extremist groups or
vulnerable people suffers from alienation or the existence of supportive social norms that
similar to or can be manipulated by the terrorist organizations. Lastly, the invisibility, as
terrorist organizations weaker than the state, the terrorist members can easily hide among the
17

local population with whom they should share common features in terms of appearance, dialect,
and behavior (Rabasa & Peters, 2007, pp. 15-19).
Reviewing the literature about the causes of terrorism suggests that both ungovernability
and relative deprivation hold the most explanatory power for the case in North Sinai. Based on
a primary assessment, North Sinai is less developed, has lots of places of hide and supports
lucrative smuggling operations. However, the ungovernability focuses more on factors that have
been present in North Sinai for some time, but it is possible that it has become less governed
after 2011 and 2013. This invites a need for closer investigation of the case study of North Sinai
to empirically explore the process of how the ungovernability dimensions and relative
deprivation could generate terrorism. The explanation of the ungovernability dimensions and
relative deprivation as well as justification of focusing on North Sinai province as the case
study will be elaborated throughout the next section.
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Chapter Three: Methodology and Conceptual Framework
3.1: Justification of Case Study Selection
Both ungoverned spaces and terrorism are now prevalent within different states in the
Middle East region post the Arab Spring, and both produce a threat to the state security, and in
return have implications on the Middle East regional security. Meanwhile, the existing scholar
literature is still underdeveloped in providing an analytical explanatory process of the
relationship between these two variables. Starting from assumption that “A significant part of
what we know about the social and political world comes from case studies” (Vennesson, 2008,
p. 223), this study aims at exploring how the ungovernability dimensions could produce
terrorism through tackling in-depth empirical investigation of Egypt’s North Sinai case study.
As North Sinai is one of the most affected spaces by terrorism post the Arab Spring, this raises
a theoretical question about the dynamics of interaction between ungovernability dimensions
and terrorism. Therefore, this study uses the interpretive case study approach. The data that
could be generated and interpreted from North Sinai case study would provide an empirical
contribution and enhance the analytical explanatory framework of the relationship between
these two variables. Moreover, the examination of North Sinai case study could be an important
policy component as it is considered a significant borderland affecting Middle East security
dynamics.

3.2: Conceptual Framework
This study explores the relationship between the ungovernability dimensions
(independent variable) and the terrorism phenomena (dependent variable) in North Sinai post
2011 revolution. Specifically, it measures the relativeness of ungovernability dimensions to the
case of Egypt’s North Sinai province, and how these dimensions have produced terrorism in
19

North Sinai. Mainly, this study primarily uses ungovernability dimensions that explained by
Rand Corporation study on “ungoverned territories”. These dimensions are lack of the state
penetration into society, monopoly on the use of force, control over borders, and external
interference. These four dimensions cover the social, economic, and political dimensions;
meanwhile, they consist of specific indicators that can be measured. For the sake of enhancing
this ungovernability model and understand better the case of terrorism in North Sinai province,
this conceptual framework uses the relative deprivation theory and state repression concept; as
it seems that there is interconnectedness, specifically between relative deprivation, state
repression and state penetration in society in terms of terrorism production in Northern Sinai.
State Penetration into Society: Basically, this dimension evaluates the state
presence, weakness, or absence of the state institutions, including welfare institutions such as
health and education institutions. Moreover, it evaluates the power, authority and legitimacy of
the state institutions in comparison to other social institutions (tribes or clans). The state
penetration into society is reflected in the degree of a state authority to conduct law enforcement
and compliance. For the sake of measuring and analyzing the state penetration into society,
RAND defined three main indicators. The first indicator is the Physical Infrastructure that
refers to “the physical dimension of the state’s presence in a space” (Rabasa & Peters, 2007, p.
8). This study explains this indicator through an assessment of the state endeavors to conduct
socio-economic development in North Sinai through comparative analysis between North Sinai
and South Sinai to figure out the disparity, if any. The second indicator is the Corruption and
the Prevalence of the Informal Economy; it measures the existence of corruption among
government officials and prevalence of underground economy, in which this economy
transcends the state control (Rabasa & Peters, 2007, p. 9). This study uses this indicator to
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explain the prevalence of corruption and underground tunnels and their effects in a causing shift
in the livelihood of People in North Sinai. The third indicator is the Social and Cultural
Resistance to Penetration by State Institutions, it is defined as “the populace disputes the
legitimacy of the state and its institutions, and prefers to have other entities—ethnic groups,
clans, tribes, extended families—serve as the basis for social, judicial, and political
organization” (Rabasa & Peters, 2007, p. 9). This study uses this indicator to measure the social,
judicial, and political legitimacy of the tribal system in North Sinai. Importantly, GovernmentBedouins relationship is considered to understand the legitimacy of the tribal system in
comparison to the state legitimacy. Moreover, this indicator measures legitimacy of the new
rising phenomenon of what is called ‘non-state Sharia courts in North Sinai.
Relative Deprivation Paradigm and State Repression: this study uses the relative
deprivation paradigm and state repression concept in order to enrich the nexus between state
penetration into society and terrorism in North Sinai.
The relative deprivation theory is defined by Gur as “actors’ perception of discrepancy between
their value expectations and their value capabilities. The tension that develops from a
discrepancy between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value of satisfaction, and that
disposes men to violence” (Gurr, 1970, pp. 23-24). The theory argues that absolute deprivation
is not a condition to breed violence, but the main drive of resorting to violence comes through
their sense that they are relatively deprived in comparison to other groups in the society or state
(Gurr, 1970, pp. 22-30). In an enhancement to this theory, Taspinare argues that the
convergence of economic, social, and political relative deprivation breeds a ground for
radicalization and terrorism (Taspinar, 2009). Further enhancement found that the opportunity
of increasing violence happens when these expectations of those relatively deprived individuals
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are met by state repression (Martin, 2003, p. 61). Based this theory and its further
enhancements, this study also uses the concept of State Repression as the case study of North
Sinai provides evidence of state repression. This concept is defined as “it involves the actual or
threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial
jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring
specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices
or institutions” (Davenport, 2007, p. 2).
Therefore, this study uses both the relative deprivation in terms of socio-economic and political
deprivation and state repression to analyze the nexus between state penetration into society and
terrorism in North Sinai. The main indicator will be the level of radicalization and
participation/support of North Sinai Bedouins in terrorist activities as a result of combined
socio-economic and political relative deprivation as well as state repression.
Monopoly on the Use of Force: in spaces like remote areas where the state reach is
weak, “alternatives to this state monopoly emerge” (Rabasa & Peters, 2007, pp. 9-10). Mainly.
Three main indicators measure this dimension. The first indicator measures the Presence of
Organized Armed Groups outside the State’s Control; these groups might conduct terrorist
activities, participate in illegal activities as well as threaten the citizens’ life, which in return
shakes the state legitimacy, as the citizens view the state is ineffective to protect them. This
indicator analyzes the origin, presence, and number of armed groups and fighters, their ability to
operate in North Sinai, and their strength to achieve casualties among the Egyptian security
forces. The second indicator measures the Presence of Criminal Networks Linked to Terrorist
or Insurgent Groups; this could be a result of having a common enemy ‘Government’, sharing
the same infrastructure and facilities, or both have mutual interests. This indicator is analyzed
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through exploring the relationship between the smuggler Bedouins and extremist militants
groups. The third indicator measures the Population with Access to Weapons (Rabasa & Peters,
2007, pp. 9-11). This indicator is analyzed through the accessibility of Bedouins to weapons.
These four indicators are analyzed in relation to terrorism escalation.
Control over Borders: most of the ungoverned spaces are always located in remote
or border areas. States have challenges to control borders when extended tribes exist on both
sides of borders or there are difficulties in achieving cooperation with the neighboring states.
Insurgent or terrorist groups use the borders to move, trade, and receive inputs (Rabasa &
Peters, 2007, p. 12). In this study, this dimension measures the power of Egyptian state in
comparison to non-state actors such as extending tribes on borders and smuggling networks to
control borders. This dimension is measured through exploring the role of extended tribes (on
Sinai-Gaza borders) in flourishing the underground tunnels. Furthermore, this dimension
explores the role of the underground tunnels between North Sinai and Gaza in facilitating
terrorist operations. Additionally, this dimension measures the ability of the Egyptian state to
conduct cooperation with Israel and Hamas in achieving border security and avoidance of
terrorist attacks.
External Interference: in the context of ungovernability, external interference means
a direct or indirect interference by an external power (commonly a bordering state) to exercise
some political and economic control over the space. This occurs when an exterior power
perceives a power vacuum and moves to fill it. In return, the external interference impedes more
the state ability to control this space. The external interference not solely measures the role of
these external actors, but also their ability to influence the internal dynamics within the state
(Rabasa & Peters, 2007, pp. 12-13). This study primarily focuses on the ideological, military,
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and economic influence by non-state actors such the Gaza extremist militant groups in Southern
Gaza, Hamas, foreign fighters, and most importantly the Islamic State terrorist group (IS).
Moreover, the study assesses the external influence of Israel through measuring the impact of
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty 1979 restrictions on the Egyptian state ability to use force.
Therefore, this conceptual framework that contains four ungovernability dimensions,
relative deprivation theory, and state repression will be analyzed in relation to terrorism
escalation in North Sinai. The terrorism definition is used in this study is explained in the
following section.

3.3: Data Collection
This study depends on both primary and secondary data resources. The primary resource
includes conducting twenty in-depth interviews in semi-structured approach with local citizens
and Bedouins from North Sinai province, journalists who report from Sinai, government
officials, academic scholars, researchers, and experts in the Sinai issue. Primary resources also
include terrorist incidence in North Sinai through depending on reliable database websites such
as the START Global Terrorism Database (GTD) as well as Tahrir Institute for Middle East
Policy (TIMEP). The secondary resources include books, previous academic studies, policy
papers, international organization reports, think tanks reports, governmental database website,
and published interviews with the population of North Sinai that describe their livelihood.
There is no consensus on the terrorism concept neither on the policymaking side nor on
the academic side, and there are different definitions for terrorism. Moreover, after reading and
analyzing the various concepts of terrorism, the researcher found that many conceptions are
very ambiguous and some of them are defined according to particular cases of terrorism. Hence,
this paper uses the definition of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) that defines terrorism as
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"the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a
political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (“Data
Collection Methodology”, n.d.). This definition is clear, consistent with the literature, and
applicable to the situation in Sinai.

3.4: Data Analysis
As this study an interpretive study aims at depth understanding of an explanatory
framework of the relationship between terrorism and ungovernability dimensions. It uses
qualitative methods of analysis, as they are most suitable methods to answer the question of
how not what. Fundamentally, the data analysis is conducted through interpretive process
tracing approach. This approach allows the study to use the concepts/themes in the outlined
conceptual framework as a chain to provide an explanation of the collected data on how
ungovernability dimensions interact and produce terrorism. For the sake of understanding better
the terrorism phenomenon in the case study of North Sinai, this study uses some basic
descriptive statistical methods to show the terrorism curve, causality curve, targets types, and
attacks by groups.

3.5: Limitation
The only limitation to this study lies in the hardness of the security situation in North
Sinai that has been almost a war zone since 2011. Accordingly, this makes the field study
infeasible to be conducted. However, it was better to conduct questionnaires and field
observation, but this study sublets this limitation through conducting twenty interviews with
different concerned people as mentioned before in the data collection section.
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Chapter Four: Analysis and Discussions
4.1: Description of Terrorism Pattern in Northern Sinai Post 2011 Revolution
Egypt went through two political transitions in 2011 and 2013. Post each of this political
transition, Egypt’s North Sinai witnessed a rise of terrorist attacks, especially in the cities of in
Rafah, Sheikh Zewaid, and Al-Arish (see figure 3). As it is shown below in figure 1 and figure
2, there was an emergence of terrorism phenomena post 2011 that reached 21 attacks between
July 2011 and June 2012, which caused the death of 21 personnel from the Egyptian security
forces. Under Mursi’s rule between July 2012 and June 2013, there was another rise of terrorist
attacks that reached 50 attacks and caused the death of 45 from Egyptian security forces. Post
the ousting of President Mursi; North Sinai unprecedentedly witnessed an intensity of terror.
However, there was an increase in the terrorist attacks between July and September 2013 that
reached 174 attacks with total 66 total casualties in Egyptian security forces, but there was a
decrease from October 2013 to September 2014 that reached 173 attacks with 82 casualties
among Egyptian security forces. Again from October 2014 to December 2015, North Sinai
witnessed another unprecedented sharp increase of terrorist attacks that reached 450 attacks, and
the casualties between January-September 2015 reached 183. Thus, terrorism in Egypt’s North
Sinai appeared as a sustained terror.
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Figure 1 - Number of Terrorists Attacks in North Sinai (2011-2015)
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Sources: (the data are collected by the researcher from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism, 2016; TIMEP, 2015a, pp. 2, 8-9; TIMEP, 2015b, P. 9; TIMEP, 2015c, P. 8; TIMEP,
2015d, P. 2; TIMEP, 2015f, P. 8; TIMEP, 2015g, P. 8; TIMEP, 2015h, P. 12; TIMEP, 2016, P. 5)

Figure 2 - Number of Casualties in Security Forces by Terrorist Attacks 2011-2015
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Numer of Casulaties in Security
Forces by Terrorist Attacks 20112015

Figure 3 - Terrorist Attacks by Location in North Sinai

Source: Egypt Security Watch – TIMEP
The figure 4 aims at explaining the target type of terrorist attacks by the extremist
militant groups. The terrorist’ attacks targets include military, police, civilians, economic
targeting or utilities, government buildings, tourists, and others. As shown below, the attacks
against the security establishments and personnel (Military and Police) are considered the
largest portion of targets by the extremist militant groups that are estimated by 68% of total
targets between periods 2011-2014. Moreover, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)
Troops have been targets of the extremist militant groups. In March 2012, militant Bedouins
sieged an MFO camp for eight days. In September in 2012, automatic weapons and grenades
attacked another MFO camp. Furthermore, the MFO members have repeatedly been targeted for
kidnappings in 2013 such the Hungarian’s peacekeeper who was kidnapped in April 2013
(Dyer, & Kessler, 2014, p. 13). In August 2015, an IED was placed by SPIS near an MFO camp
that wounded six MFO members (Schenker, 2015, pp. 4-5)
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The second largest portion of terrorist attacks target is considered violence against
civilians that it is estimated by 9% of total targets between 2011- 2014. The militants in North
Sinai do not conduct violence against civilians unless those civilians are collaborating with the
security forces or hindering militants’ operations. Some of those who were killed by the
militants are Faraj Abu Bekheit, Sheikh Khalaf el-Menai, Suleiman Khalaf el-Menai, Sheikh
Naif Sawarka, Walid Al-Manai, and many others (“Egyptian civilians in crosshairs of Sinai
militants”, 2013.) A Militant Bedouin said, “We capture anyone who betrays us. We behead
anyone who is a traitor. This scares other people so that they don’t act against us. This is the
language and ways of Daesh” (Georgy & Woods, 2015, p. 4). Additionally, those militant
groups conducted sectarian violence against Copt residents in North Sinai. Some civilian Copts
were killed by the extremist militants such as Magdy Lamie, Hani Samir Kamel, and Father
Mina Abud Sharubiyin. Moreover, other Copt families had to flee from Rafah as a result of
their fear from the militant groups (“Egyptian civilians in crosshairs of Sinai militants”, 2013).
Thus, the violence against both civilians and Copts erodes more the state legitimacy and
monopoly on the use of force as the state not able to protect civilians’ safety.
There are also other attacks and most significantly the economic targeting. As part of the
economic war of militants against the Egyptian state, numerous bombing attacks were
conducted against utilities in North Sinai that it is estimated to be 7% of the total target attacks
during 2011 - 2015, with concentration on the gas pipeline in North Sinai; the gas pipeline
mainly feeds the industrial zone in Egypt, Jordon and Israel. The first time it took place was
during Mubarak’s rule, followed approximately by fifteen other attacks after the ouster of
president Mubarak. Therefore, this reflects two main dimensions; this can mirror the feeling of
Bedouins’ relative deprivation as they perceive that these gas resources are stolen by Cairo at
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their expense, whilst the militant extremist perceive that these resources are stolen from the
Muslims and sold to their enemy “Israel” (Gold, 2014, pp. 3-5).
Figure 4 - Percentage of Total Target Type of the Terrorist Attacks in North Sinai (20112014)
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Sources: (The figure is calculated by the researcher using the source of National Consortium for the Study
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016)

However, the outer look at the terrorism curve in Egypt’s North Sinai explains that the
terrorist attacks are results of ousting the Islamist former President Mursi, but this does not
explain the rise of terrorist attacks under Mursi as the extremist militants reject the idea of
democracy that is accepted by the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, it does not explain the
sustainability of terror in North Sinai with the same intensity in comparison to other Egypt’s
regions and it does not explain the increase of terrorist attacks in late 2014 and 2015. This
drives the study to focus in the next analysis section on how the ungovernability dimensions
and relative deprivation have been able to produce terror in North Sinai.
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4.2: Measurement and Analysis of Ungovernability Dimensions Nexus to
Terrorism in North Sinai Province
Basically, this section is considered the core of measuring and analyzing the
independent variable, which is resembled in the ungovernability dimensions. These dimensions
are the monopoly on the use of force, state penetration into society, control over borders, and
external interference.

4.2.1: First Dimension: Monopoly on the Use of Force
Principally, this dimension aims at measuring the Egyptian monopoly on the use of
force in North Sinai province and its interconnectedness to terrorism in the region. This
dimension tackles three main indicators: the presence of organized armed groups; North Sinai’s
Bedouins with access to weapons; and presence of criminal networks linked to terrorist groups.

4.2.1.1: Presence of Extremist Militant Groups in Sinai
The first presence of the extremist militant groups in North Sinai started by the
emergence of Tawhid Wal-Jihad group that conducted different activities between 2004-2006;
notably the police was able to suppress this group by the end of 2006 (“Al Tawhid Wal Jihad”,
n.d.). Before the 2011 revolution, the extremist militant groups re-emerged again and showed
an ability to spread their ideologies and get affiliations from North Sinai population, especially
on the border cities and villages, and their terrorist attacks were only targeting Israel not Egypt
(A former governor of North Sinai, personal communication, February 6, 2016). It is argued
that the use of violence against Israel, before and after the revolution as well as the gas pipeline
bombing was to attain the sympathy from Sinai population, in return being able to impose their
rule as they are fighting Israel “the enemy of Arab” (S. Hassan, personal communication,
November 30, 2015).
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Currently, there are almost above fifteen extremist militant groups operating in North
Sinai such as the Sinai Province of the Islamic State (formerly known as Ansar Bayt AlMaqdis), Tawhid Wal-Jihad, Al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula, Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen,
Jaish Al-Islam and Jund al-Islam (See below Table 1). The number of these militants is
approximately 2,000 militants (Gaub, 2015, p. 3; A Bedouin teacher from Al-Sawarka tribe and
a prominent member in a developmental NGO based in North Sinai, personal communication,
February 4, 2016). The members of these groups include radicalized Bedouins (especially from
Tarabeen tribe and Masaaid clan in Sawarka tribe), Salfi extremists affiliated to other extremist
groups in Gaza, escaped and released extremist prisoners (took North Sinai as a safe haven),
militants from Hamas, foreign fighters with Arab and African nationalities, Egyptian Jihadists
who spent time in Afghanistan and returned after 2012, and some criminal smugglers who
turned into terrorist groups (Yaari, 2012, p. 2; Pelham, 2012, pp.3-4; Reuters/Stringer, 2014, pp.
2-4; Dentice & Paolo, 2014, pp. 78-80 & Benari, 2012; a former deputy head of the Egyptian
Intelligence Directorate, personal communication, March 13, 2016; A Bedouin teacher from AlSawarka tribe and a prominent member in a developmental NGO based in North Sinai, personal
communication, February 4, 2016; A female human rights activist and resident in North Sinai,
personal communication, November 30, 2015). It is argued that after ABM declared alliance
with the Islamic State terrorist group (IS), all these fifteen groups got aliened into SPIS group,
except for roughly 50-60 members who reject the Islamic State ideology. Those militants have
formed a new group called Al-Morabteen group under the leadership of Hisham Ashmawy and
still affiliated to Al-Qaeda (Anonymous EX-Radical Islamist and researcher specialized in the
Islam militant movements, personal communication, November 30, 2015; Awad & Hashem,
2015, p. 18; A. Sakr, personal communication, November 11, 2015).
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Table 1 - Most Active Extremist Militant Groups in North Sinai

Leadership/
members

Group name

Established

Sinai Province
of the Islamic
State
(formerly
known as
Ansar Bayt
Al-Maqdis)

2012

Tawhid WalJihad

2004

Al-Qaeda in
the
Sinai
Peninsula
(know also as
Ansar alJihad)

2011

Majlis Shura
AlMujahideen
(Active in
Gaza-Sinai)
Jaysh AlIslam (Army
of Islam)

2011-2012

Hisham alSaedni
[deceased]

2006

Mumtaz
Dughmush

Ibrahim
Aweida
[killed];
Mohamed
Ibrahim Freg
[killed];
Shadi AlMenaei; Kamal
Allam
Ahmed
Hamdan Harb
Malki
[Deceased];
Bedouin
Khaled
Massaad
Salem;
Hisham alSaedni
[deceased];
Abu Munir
[deceased]
Nasr Khamis
Al-Mallahy
Ramzi
Mahmoud AlMowafi
(served as AlQaeda’s chief
chemicalweapons
producer)

Goal

Ideology/
Affiliation

Most
common
Attack
type(s)
Bombings

Most
common
Target
type(s)
Military;
Security
Forces; Israel

Most
common
Attack
location(s)
North Sinai
(Rafah,
Arish, and
Sheikh
Zuwid)
Cairo;
Eilat, Israel

Notable Attacks in
North Sinai

-Promotion of
Jihadism;
- Imposition
of Sharia law;
- Creation of
an Islamic
state in Egypt.

- Jihadism;
- Alliance
with the
Islamic State
group (IS)

Implementati
on of the
sharia law.

- Jihadism;
- Al-Qaeda’s
ideologically
- The state
institutions
are
illegitimate

Shootings

Police

North Sinai
and South
Sinai

- Different terrorist
attacks in South Sinai
that caused the death
of 34 tourists (2004
and 2006)
- Killed 16 Egyptian
soldiers (2012)

Establishment
of an Islamic
emirate in the
Sinai;
-Terminate
Camp David
treaty to end
the ‘‘siege’’
in Gaza
- Establish the
Caliphate
Implementing
Sharia law
Establishing
the Islamic
Caliphate.

Salafism and
Jihadism

Bombings

Pipelines

North Sinai

Gas pipeline attacks
(May 2012)

- Jihadism;
- Support for
the Islamic
State (IS)

Rocket
attacks

Eilat, Israel

Israel

Rocket attacks
against Israel in 2014

- Rejection
of the state
notion;
- Praising
Al-Qaeda’s
Ideology
- based in
Gaza and
Sinai

Bombings;
Ambush;
kidnapping
; rockets

Religious
targets;
Security
forces;
civilians

North Sinai;
Alexandria;
Israel

Killed 16 soldiers in
cross border attack
(2012)
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- Attacked 21
security facilities and
checkpoints. (July 1,
2015)
- Claimed
responsibility for
bombing the Russian
plane in Sinai (2015)

Jund Al-Islam

2011

N/A

N/A

- Loyal to
Al-Qaeda
- The
Egyptian
military as
traitors of
Islam.

Bombings

Military

North Sinai

Attack against Rafah
intelligence buildingkilled six people a d
wounded 17 more
(September 2013)

Sources: Data are collected by the researcher from (Dyer & Kessler, 2014, p. 32-44; Dentice, & Paolo, 2014, p.
78-80; Gold, 2014, pp. 7-8; “Wilayat Sinai”, n.d.; “Tawhid Wal-Jihad”, 2014; International Crisis Group,
2007,p. 4; “Al Tawhid Wal Jihad”, n.d.; Sub Committee on Counterterrorism, 2014, pp. 15-16; Dyer, 2014, pp.
40-41; “; Gold, 2014, pp. 7-8; Georgy & Woods, 2015, pp. 2-3; Alexandrani, 2015, p. 2; “Majlis Shura alMujahedeen”, n.d.; Al-Tamimi, 2014; “Jaysh Al-Islam”, 2014; “Jund al-Islam”, n.d.)

The Monopoly on the Use of Force Post 2011 Revolution: Comparing the State
versus the Extremist Militant Groups Strength
For the sake of analyzing the monopoly on the use of force, it is crucial to analyze the
strength of the extremist militant groups in terms of conducting terrorist attacks and realizing
casualties among the security forces in comparison to the Egyptian military ability to conduct
military operations and achieve casualties among the militant groups.
According to figure 6, there was a weakness of the Egyptian monopoly on the use force
post 2011 revolution until mid-2013 in favor of the extremist militant groups that conducted
numerous terrorist attacks in North Sinai post 2011. The peak of lack of monopoly on the use
force was in 2011 until mid-2013. However, under the SCAF’s and Mursi’ rule the military
increased number of troops in Sinai and launched ‘Operation Eagle’ in August 2011 and
“Operation Sinai” in August 2012, but the counter terrorism operations were very weak to
discontinue the terrorist attacks that were much more intense than the military response
(Aftandilian, 2015, pp. 8-11). Figure 7 shows that between 2011 and June 2013, there were 66
casualties among the security forces, and almost 33 casualties among the extremist militant
groups by the Egyptian security forces. A resident from North Sinai said that between those
periods “we witnessed a security vacuum that has not never been witnessed before” (Personal
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communication, November 30, 2015), and a Bedouin from Al-Sawarka tribe said also during
this period “we used to see the jihadist movements members in the streets with their black flag
in the street, not only in the villages, but even in Al-Arish the capital city” (Personal
communication, February 4, 2016). Musri was able to visit Al-Arish only, but due to the
weakness of the state control over the other areas; he was unable to visit other areas (Sabry,
2015, pp. 179-202).
An indicator reflected the lack of monopoly on the use force from 2011 until mid-2013,
Israel through recruiting some Bedouins was able to assassinate different leaders of SPIS such
as Ibrahim Oweida Bereikat who was assassinated on August 26 2012 (Alexandrani, 2014, pp.
9-12). Moreover, in 2013, it launched a drone strike that targeted militants in Sinai, which led to
death of five militant and destruction of a rocket launcher (AP & Times of Israel, 2013; Sabry,
2015, pp. 203-230). It was reported by the Western officials saying that there was a prior
agreement between Egypt and Israel, in which Israel was given the right to intervene and attack
the militants if the Egyptian military failed to counter them (Dyer, & Kessler, 2014, pp. 19-21).
Although, this can reflect the unprecedented cooperation between Egypt and Israel in securing
the border areas, but it reflects lack of Egyptian monopoly on the use force during this period.
The issue of the Egyptian monopoly on the use of force in North Sinai province is not
limited to cities like Al-Arish and the main roads, but in the villages, particularly the poor ones.
A former deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate and a resident called Mustafa
Abu Salman from Al- Bars village said that since 2011 the militants succeeded in controlling
different villages in North Sinai, especially in Sheikh Zwaid, Al-Hasana, and Al-Nekhl and it
was difficult for the security forces to go inside these villages. Therefore, the military was only
able to conduct attacks in these spaces through helicopters solely (A former deputy head of the
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Egyptian Intelligence Directorate, personal communication, March 13, 2016; Reuters/Stringer,
2014, p. 2). The Army Spokesman in September 2013 said, “Police and military forces hadn’t
entered the villages of Mehdiya, Madfuna, and Nage Shibana since year 2002” (Sabry, 2015,
pp. 203-230). Therefore, the weakness of the monopoly on the use of force was clear between
2011 and 2013 in some villages of Northern Sinai that were considered the hub of militants.
Another dimension to the issue of the monopoly on the use force by the state is the
invisibility of the militants, in which they hide between citizens as many of them come from
local tribes. A militant from SPIS in an interview with Reuters said, “At the start of the fighting
we used to hide in mountains, but now we are present in the villages among residents, because
it is safer there” (Reuters/Stringer, 2014, p. 3). A security official in North Sinai said “People
could come by now and talk to us pretending to be civilians and after a few days they blow
themselves up at a checkpoint,”; he added, “Once we went to attack a village and found one of
them (a militant) had passed by us days earlier telling us ‘may God give you victory over the
terrorists; a few days later we arrested him during clashes in a village” (Georgy & Woods,
2015, p. 5). This explains that many Bedouin villages in Northern Sinai are considered a safe
haven for the extremist militant groups.
However, post overthrowing President Mursi in July 2013 as it is shown in figure 6, the
Egyptian monopoly on the use force increased through launching ‘Second Operation Desert
Storm’, ‘Martyr’s rights’, and ‘Martyr’s rights II’, but the level of terrorist attacks by the
militants group were very intense. Between July 2013 and December 2014, the number of
casualties among security forces increased from 45 (July 2012 –June 2013) to 193, meanwhile
the casualties among militates reached 672 in comparison to 33 between (July 2012 –June
2013). However, 2014 showed a great strength of the militants, while 2015 witnessed more
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control of the Egyptian security forces. From January to September 2015, the number of
casualties among the militants reached 1675 militants, whilst the casualties among militants
were 132. A security official commenting on SPIS “A year ago we could not get to places
where they hide, but now we are spreading across North Sinai” (Georgy & Woods, 2015, p. 2).
Eid Salman, a resident in North Sinai said, “We used to see lots of SPIS pass in front of our
house in cars waving their black flags one year ago, now we barely see them. Life is much
calmer.” (Georgy & Woods, 2015, pp. 2-4). In 2015, a militant interviewed by a Reuters
reporter said, “Lots of people were killed, lots of people were detained, security forces are
everywhere. About 1,000 of us have been killed, and about 500 or 600 arrested. There are far
fewer weapons because tunnels have been destroyed; it is difficult to move weapons” (Georgy
& Woods, 2015, pp. 2-4). Accordingly, it seems that the military took a step in achieving
predominance over the militant groups since 2015 as the number of casualties is much higher at
the militant side in comparison to casualties at the security forces’ side as a result of the counter
terrorism campaign by the Egyptian military, but it does mean the deterrence of those militant
groups as the terrorist attacks still occur in North Sinai.
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Figure 5 - Comparing the Militant Attacks versus the Egyptian Security Forces Attacks
(2011-2015)
2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Red color: it represents the militant attacks on government forces and civilians.
Purple color: it represents the military counter terrorism attacks on the militant groups.
Source: Comparing the Militant Attacks versus the Egyptian Security Forces Attacks - Source: (Hassan,
Bayoumy, & Woods, 2015, p. 4)

Figure 6 - Comparing the Casualties among Extremist Militant Groups and Egyptian
Security Forces (2011-2015)
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The Relationship between the Terrorist Operations by Extremist Militant Groups in
North Sinai and the Muslim Brotherhood Group
As it is shown in figure 2, the terrorist attacks by the extremist militant groups escalated
rapidly after ousting the Islamist President Mursi, who is affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood;
the Egyptian government always associates these terrorist activities in North Sinai to the
Muslim Brotherhood. Thus far, there is no clear evidence that connects the terrorist activities to
the Muslim Brotherhood, except for, Mohamed Al-Belitagy, the leader in Muslim Brother who
stated, “Attacks in Sinai would stop the second President Mohammed Mursi is reinstated" (Akin
& Fahmy, 2013).
It is perceived that the extremist militant groups have no connection to the MB, but
these groups determined that the state launches a war not only against the MB, but also against
all Islamic groups, and doubtless the extremist or jihadist militant ones. Accordingly, these
militant groups reacted and conducted a preemptive war against the state security establishment.
Furthermore, it seems from the SPIS rhetoric statements, that it has exploited the opportunity
through conducting Islamic rhetoric statements in order to launch propaganda and recruit many
youth, especially from members of the Muslim Brotherhood who can easily be radicalized and
potentially be jihadists.

4.2.1.2: North Sinai’s Bedouins with Access to Weapons
Basically, the population access to weapons reflects the weakness of the state monopoly
on the use of force. The prevalence of weapons among Bedouins is very common in the Sinai
Peninsula. As the state presence is weak in North Sinai, the Bedouins used to possess weapons
to protect their lands and property, which led to proliferation of weapons among Bedouins (A
former deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate, personal communication, March
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13, 2016). The Bedouins possession of weapons reflects the State of Nature according to
Hobbes, when there was no state, and everyone should protect his property. Furthermore, as any
economic property requires security protection, the proliferation of tunnels post 2007 not only
increased the quantity and quality of weapons as a result of arms smuggling, but it has urged the
need for smugglers to increase their level of armament to protect these tunnels (A female human
rights activist and resident in North Sinai, personal communication, November 30, 2015).
During 2011 revolution, the level of violence by Bedouins against police and security
establishments was higher than other Egypt’s provinces because North Sinai is an armed
society. A Bedouin leader and smuggler in North Sinai called Abu Ahsraf “Protests aren’t really
in our nature; our nature is…, he said, then stopped, smiled and pantomimed firing a gun”
(Hauslohner, 2013). Therefore, the Bedouins’ accessibility to weapons affected negatively on
the state monopoly on the use of force, and in return increased the state inability to govern
effectively.

4.2.1.3: Presence of Criminal Networks Linked to Terrorist Groups
Among the indicators of the weakness of monopoly on the use of force is the presence
of criminal networks linked to terrorist groups. Recently, there have been rapprochement and
fusion of identities between the smuggler Bedouins and extremist militant groups (Pelham,
2012, p.14). The strengthened relationship between militants and smugglers Bedouins is based
on numerous factors. Initially, some of those who are part of the extremist militant groups were
originally smugglers. For instance, Shadi-Manei the former leader of SPIS was a smuggler (Z.
Gold, personal communication, December 2, 2015). Furthermore, both Bedouins smugglers and
militants have interdependent relationship in the arms smuggling process through the
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underground tunnels (O. Al-Salami, personal communication, November 28, 2015; Anonymous
political researcher specialized in security studies, personal communication, February 3, 2016).
Most notably, both Bedouin smugglers and militants have interests in no state control.
An indicator that interprets the increase of terror post ousting Mursi, the smugglers enjoyed the
anarchy that prevailed under Mursi’s rule and his passivity towards the underground tunnels to
support Hamas, and the counter terrorism campaign against the underground tunnels post July
2013 affected them negatively as it devastated their business (Hauslohner, 2013). Therefore, the
possibility of cooperation between the smuggler Bedouins and militants has been increasing
post the counter terrorism campaign as currently both are sharing a common enemy ‘state’s
security apparatus’. For instance, the smugglers who killed some Egyptian border security
guards are not militants (Holt-Ivry, 2014, p. 106). This gives an indicator that the smuggler
Bedouins are not solely cooperating with militants in smuggling weapons, but also indicates the
involvement of smuggler Bedouins in terrorist activities as their economic interest is under
threat by the government.
Hence, the terrorist attacks by the extremist militant groups, Bedouins’ accessibility to
weapons, and the linkage between criminal smuggler networks clearly indicate the weakness of
the state monopoly on use of force. One might conclude that the weakness of monopoly on the
use of force has deteriorated further as a result of the weakness of state penetration into North
Sinai society.

4.2.2: Second Dimension: State Penetration into North Sinai Society
The Sinai Peninsula represents 6% of Egypt’s total space, but it is considered a sparsely
population region; the total number of population in the Sinai are estimated in 2014 to be
587,000, which is 0.7% only of Egypt’s total population. Administratively, Sinai is divided into
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two provinces of approximately equivalent space; 422,000 inhabit the Northern part, which is
most of Sinai population, whilst the southern part is inhabited only by 165,000 (“population”,
2014; International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 6; Dyer, & Kessler, 2014, p. 12). The majority of the
inhabitants of Sinai Peninsula is the Bedouins whom are estimated to be between 70% official
inhabitants in the region, while the other 30% are divided among immigrants from other
Egypt’s provinces as well as people immigrated with different distinct origins (Yaari, 2012, p.
2; International Crisis Group, 2007, pp. 10-12).

4.2.2.1: Physical Presence of the State in North Sinai – the State Endeavors to
Develop North Sinai: Comparative Analysis between North and South Sinai SocioEconomic Development
The state penetration into North Sinai society has been very limited economically,
socially and politically. Since the restoration of the Sinai Peninsula in 1982, Egypt planned to
achieve development in the region, but only private sector led development in South Sinai,
whilst North Sinai province was left underdeveloped. Under President Sadat, there was a plan
for immigrating five million people from the Nile Valley to Sinai, 643,000 acres for irrigation
and agricultural and delivering fresh water from Nile Valley to Sinai (Yaari, 2012, p. 11). After
a decade of the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, the Egyptian government launched
a development project called “National project for developing Sinai” between periods of 19942017; the investment estimated cost for that project was 75 billion pounds. The project
objective was mainly to increase the population by about three million people, and create jobs
by about 8000, through the achievement of agricultural and industrial development and tourism
in the Sinai Peninsula (Ghitani, 2014). In 2000, the project expanded to include the provinces of
Suez Canal to reach new total investment cost of about 251.7 billion pounds. Based on a study
assessment by the Institute of National Planning, the compilation of this project did not exceed
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20% to 30% only, and the population did not exceed 1/6 of the target. Moreover, the study
showed that even the achieved little development is no longer beneficial to the people of Sinai
(Ghitani, 2014). Apparently, the state has marginalized North Sinai at point of socio-economic
development that led to weakness of the physical presence of the state.
The interior and the coast above Bir Al-Abd are still excluded from the agriculture
development policies. Al-Arish, Sheikh Zwaid and Rafah cities that are heavily dependent on
the water due to their production of vegetables and fruits that they deliver to tourism projects to
South Sinai depend on only over-used groundwater and rainfall. Moreover, drinking water is
allocated by tanker-lorries in the nonexistence of a water-supply network (International Crisis
Group, 2007, p. 18).
In 1997, as part of North Sinai Agricultural Development Project (NSADP), the state
built the Peace Canal in order to reach the Nile water beyond Suez Canal; nevertheless, it is
insufficient as it suffers from water deficiencies, and if the water exists it is infected by saline
groundwater and waste from the Hadous and Serw drains (Holt-Ivry, 2014, p. 8). Furthermore,
it irrigates only lands of Qantara as far as Bir Al-’Abd, which is ¼ of the target spaces
(International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 18). Moreover, the land plots that were sold for cultivation
not for Bedouins, but for the big farmers who emigrated from the Nile valley; even the weak
agriculture development in Sinai benefits nothing of Bedouins (Holt-Ivry, 2014, p. 8).
Egypt paid special attention to the development of South Sinai through launching of
energy projects and the tourism projects that attract 2.5 million tourists annually. Hundred
luxuries hotels and resorts, modern hospitals, Sharm Al-Sheikh international airport, and
another expensive infrastructure were invested in South Sinai, including Dahab, Nuwayba,
Taba, and Sharm Al-Sheikh (Yaari, 2012, p.12; International Crisis Group, 2007, pp. 13-14;
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Dyer & Kessler, 2014, p. 21; Pelham, 2012a, p. 17). On the contrary, the basic needs like
health, education, and job opportunities in North Sinai were not available and the state exerted
limited effort to improve these services. The basic economic activities in North Sinai province
are just fishing and agriculture. Only dozen industrial factories were conducted in North Sinai
(International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 17). The endeavor to conduct industries in North Sinai
province is resembled by the Businessman Hassan Rateb through conducting two cement
factories, first private university (Sinai University), and only one tourism resort that is
dependent only on the domestic tourism and failed due to lack of infrastructure in North Sinai
province (International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 18; Yaari, 2012, p.12). There are also some small
industries as glass, coal, ceramics industries as well as food production (International Crisis
Group, 2007, p. 17). However, the Sheikh Zawyek city (the home of radicals and extremist) that
is very famous for olive trees has only one olive factory owned by the military, and their
workers do not include any Bedouins (International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 18; Joya, & Gormus,
2015, p. 56).
Based on different interviews conducted by the researcher, it is found that there is nearly
a consensus that the physical presence of the state in North Sinai is very weak with lack of
economic development and trade movement. It is argued that North Sinai neither equipped by
agriculture nor industry infrastructure; in addition to the absence of urban transportation
facilities that can connect Sinai to the other Nile Valley provinces (A former deputy head of the
Egyptian Intelligence Directorate, personal communication, March 13, 2016; O. Al-Salami,
personal communication, November 28, 2015; Anonymous EX-radical Islamist and researcher
specialized in the Islam militant movements, personal communication, November 30, 2015; A
female human rights activist and resident in North Sinai, personal communication, November
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30, 2015; K. Dawoud, personal communication, December 1, 2015 Z. Gold, personal
communication, December 2, 2015). Ironically, the former governor of North Sinai said “the
infrastructure, education and health services in North Sinai are better than any other Delta
governorates, the problem is that the number of educated people among Bedouins is very low,
even if there are good cadres, they ask to work in cities, but the state does not trust to recruit
them in cities as they have harsh traits that cannot fit work environment. Therefore, it ends by
no Bedouin is working in the governmental institutions” (A Former Governor of North Sinai,
personal communication, February 6, 2016).
According to the CAPMAS as it is shown in figure 7 below, North Sinai province
witnessed a rise in the unemployment rate from 6.2% in 2009 to 15.7% in 2013, whilst it
decreased to 11.3% in 2014. Regardless this increase, the unemployment rate in North Sinai is
better than the average rate in comparison with the neighboring Canal provinces (Ismailia, Port
Siad, and Suez). The unemployment rate in North Sinai was lower than those in Canal
provinces during 2009-2014, except in 2013, that unemployment rate in North Sinai reached
15.7%. In comparison to South Sinai, North Sinai unemployment has higher unemployment
rates from 2010 to 2014.
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Figure 7 - Unemployment Rate (15 Years & more) - 2009-2014
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According to the UN Human Development report in 2010, the human development
indicators in North Sinai are above the average in comparison to the rest of Egypt’s provinces.
The adult literacy rate in North Sinai is 75.8% (compared with an Egyptian average of 70.4%).
The life expectancy is 71.2 (compared to the average of 71.7). The Unemployment rate is 3.8%
(45.9 among them hold a university degree, and 54.1% have Secondary School Certificate).
There is one clinic unit for every 29,400 citizens (the national average is one clinic unit for
every 28,500 citizens). The state provides 41.7% from the employment opportunity in the
governmental sector, and this considered above the average percentage of 25.6% (Handoussa &
et al, 2010).
The official statistics do not represent the real situation in North Sinai. Both a former
governor of North Sinai and a former and deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate
confirmed that many Bedouins do not have national IDs as they do not even have birth
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certificates (A former deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate, personal
communication, March 13, 2016; A former governor of North Sinai, personal communication,
February 6, 2016). Gilbert who conducted a field study on the status of poverty in the Sinai
Peninsula said that the official statistics do not reflect the real status of poverty as many
Bedouins are not registered in the state; consequently, are excluded from the official statistics.
For instance, he found 53% of his interviewees live in poverty (live around or below $1 per
person per day); while, the official statistics showed at that time that the poverty rate in South
Sinai is 5.3% (Walton, Gerges, & Gilbert, 2012, p. 4). A former deputy head of the Egyptian
Intelligence Directorate said, “Bedouins do not care about being registered in the state as the
state represents nothing for them, the Bedouins do not receive any benefits from the state to
make them eager to be registered in the state” (Personal communication, March 13, 2016; A
former governor of North Sinai, personal communication, February 6, 2016). Hence, the
exclusion of Bedouins from the official statistics shows an indicator of marginalization by the
state to Bedouins and lack of state penetration in North Sinai society.
One indicator of the weakness of the physical presence of the state is that the Egyptian
mobile companies do not cover all North Sinai. The Egyptian telecommunication networks are
out of services in the towns and villages bordering to Gaza and Israel, which push lots of North
Sinai inhabitants to use the Israeli networks to communicate such as Silicon, Orange, Jawal
networks

(O.

Al-Salami,

personal

communication,

November

28,

2015;

personal

communication, November 30, 2015; A female human rights activist and resident in North
Sinai, personal communication, November 30, 2015; I. Ragb, personal communication,
December 1, 2015).
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Therefore, the weakness of physical presence of the state was the first phase of the
weakness of the state penetration into society as North Sinai was almost marginalized from the
state socio-economic development. According to different interviews conducted by the
researcher, it is found that there is no special reason of marginalizing Sinai from the
development

process,

some

argue

administrative

corruption

(T.

Awaad,

personal

communication, December 3, 2015), whilst other argue that Mubark was fearing of pursuing
any changes in North Sinai that can harm the relationship with Israel (M. Salah, personal
communication, November 30, 2015). A former deputy Head of the Egyptian Intelligence
Directorate argued that there was no special reason why Sinai was neglected as many other
regions in Egypt were neglected as well (Personal communication, March 13, 2016). Moreover,
it is said that one of Mubarak’s advisors advised him to concentrate on mega projects, and
consequently the state funding started to get allocated to famous Toshka project (Yaari, 2012, p.
12).

4.2.2.2: Weakness of Physical Presence of the State and Relative Deprivation of
Bedouins
The weakness of physical presence of the state has caused a relative deprivation among
North Sinai Bedouins. The Bedouins who represent 70% of Sinai population have been
suffering from a combined economic, social and political deprivation.
The Sinai Bedouins have been suffering from social relative deprivation. Historically,
Sinai is the land of Bedouins, and they are aware that they have a distinct identity from the
Pharaonic identity. The Bedouins have the Arab tribal identity that exists in Palestine, Jordon
and among the Arabs of Israel. In other words, the Sinai Bedouins identity is oriented eastward
than the rest of Egypt (International Crisis Group, 2007, pp. 3-9). The Bedouins identity crisis
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was intensified by their marginalization from the state development projects (International
Crisis Group, 2007, p. 3; Sabry, 2015, pp. 125-130). Bedouin are desert-dwellers; many of them
have no suitable access to adequate healthcare, little or no education; they live in cinder-block
their shelters lack floors, windows, water, sanitation, and electricity (Gilbert, 2014, p. 1).
During the Israeli occupation of Sinai Peninsula from 1967 to 1982, Israel dealt positively with
the Bedouins and attempted to conduct development projects in consultation with them, which
directed many Bedouins to have a positive attitude towards Israel. Consequently, this shaped a
historical perspective by Egypt’s central government to perceive the Bedouins as collaborators
with their enemy “Israel” (Siboni & Barak, 2014, p.3-4; Joya, & Gormus, 2015, pp. 52-53;
Pelham, 2012, p. 2). A prominent member of Al-Sawarka tribe said, “Before 2011 revolution
the government and army dealt with us as if we are spies, after 2011 the revolution the it dealt
with us as we all smugglers and criminals, and now we are treated by them as if we are
terrorists” (Personal communication, February 4, 2016). He felt that he is discriminated against
by his location; while he was finalizing the procedures of the obligatory military services, the
officer asked him “where are you from?” the Bedouin responded “I am from North Sinai”, the
officer shouted on his face by saying “Go away spy of Zionists” (Personal communication,
February 4, 2016). A female human rights activist and resident in North Sinai, said, “We are
only remembered one day in a year ‘the anniversary of Sinai liberation’, while the rest of year,
we are on the newspapers accident pages and we have been suffering from accusations,
injustice, poverty, fabricated charges, and collective punishment” (Personal communication,
November 30, 2015).
Poverty rate is considered one of the most important indicators of economic relative
deprivation of North Sinai population. According to the Social Fund for Development in figure
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8, North Sinai is considered the poorest border province n 2013 and among the four poorest
province (after Assuit, Qenna, and Sohag) in Egypt. In 2011, it is estimated that 29.5% of its
inhabitants are considered poor, and in 2013 it increased to 47.7%, whilst the poverty in South
Sinai was 8% in 2011, and it was reduced to be almost free of poverty in 2013. According to the
Social Fund for Development in figure 9, in 2011, North Sinai occupied the 7th position in terms
of the distribution of the Poorest 1,000 villages among provinces. Specifically, it has 26 villages
from the 1,000 poorest villages in Egypt. Although, poverty is prevalent all across Egypt, but
the poverty rate in North Sinai reflects that the population of North Sinai are relatively deprived
in comparison to other inhabitants of other Egypt’s provinces.
Figure 8– Poverty Rate in Egypt's Provinces in 2013 by Percentage
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Figure 9 - The Distribution of the Poorest 1,000 Villages by Provinces– 2011
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The state encouraged the population who are living around the Nile Valley to immigrate
to Sinai and get access to jobs, irrigation and lands, while prohibited the Bedouins from jobs
and land property right, as the state fears that the land ownership could be transferred to the
people in Gaza or Israel. (A former deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate,
personal communication, March 13, 2016; K. Dawoud, personal communication, December 1,
2015; International Crisis Group, 2007, pp. 3-19). Bedouins were excluded to work in some
state services like police and armed forces. Most of the tourism jobs went to non-Sinairesidents; other opportunities took by non-Sinai residents and farmers, and employment
opportunities in public sector institutions in North Sinai are almost gone to people from Egypt’s
mainland (Yaari, 2012, p. 12; A former deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate,
personal communication, March 13, 2016; O. Al-Salami, personal communication, November
28, 2015). It is estimated that only 10% of Bedouins are officially employed (Dyer & Kessler,
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2014, p. 21). A Former Governor of North Sinai said, “the state fears to hire them in these
places as the state does not trust them as they harsh traits cannot fit work environment in these
places” (Personal communication, February 6, 2016).
Furthermore, Sinai Bedouins have been suffering from political exclusion. Many
Bedouins do not have the citizenship; in return, they are deprived from their basic rights and
excluded from any official statistics (Walton, Gerges, & Gilbert, 2012, p. 7; Yaari, 2012, p. 12).
Moreover, the state excluded the local Bedouins in participation in the political decisionmaking process (International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 3). A former deputy head of the Egyptian
Intelligence Directorate said, “When you see any banner made by the Egyptian state, you will
not find any one represents the Bedouins” (Personal communication, March 13, 2016).
This reflects the feeling of combined economic, social, and political relative deprivation.
It also reflects that citizens only feel solely the security governance, without any social and
economic governance. This indicates a distinction between the state capacity and state
willingness to govern. The state excludes the Bedouins intentionally to mitigate threats.
Precisely, the state perceived that inclusion of Bedouins might produce security threat to the
state. Therefore, the unwillingness of state to govern and conduct inclusion for the Bedouins led
to the weakness of state penetration into society.
After the rise of terror post 2011, the government determined the threat, and it has been
trying to conduct a rapprochement in with Bedouins (Dyer & Kessler, 2014, p. 22). Mursi’s
approach was based on dialogue with the Bedouins and also some military campaign against
terrorism such as Operation Eagle II (Siboni & Barak, 2014, p.12; Gold, 2014, pp. 12-13).
Mursi visited Sinai three times within three months, and recognized the grievances of Bedouins;
however, Bedouins were neither represented in his cabinet nor in the Constituent Assembly that
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drafted the Egyptian constitution of 2012; even the promised development project did not take
place (Pelham, 2012, p. 7). Under Mursi’s rule, the seven soldiers who were kidnapped from the
Egyptian Army in 2013 were released through the mediation of Bedouins with kidnapers (Dyer
& Kessler, 2014, p. 22). The Minister of Defense at that time, Abdel-Fatah Al-Sisi, conducted a
visit to North Sinai to listen to the marginalized Bedouins and their demands. He asked them for
their support to the Egyptian military against the extremist militant groups and promised to
allocate $165 million for North Sinai development (Aftandilian, 2015, pp. 8-11). Under Al-Sisi
presidency, an unprecedented event took place in the context of the Government-Bedouins
relations, in which 73 Bedouin clans declared their unity to assist the military in their war
against the militants. (“Tribes unite to assist military in Sinai”, 2015). The challenging aspect
though, is that not all Bedouin tribes are included in this alliance. For instance, the Sawarka
tribe is not represented in this alliance as large numbers of militants are from Sawarka tribe
(Hassan, Bayoumy, & Woods, 2015, pp. 5-6). A resident from Al-Mehdiya Village in North
Sinai said “I will not expose myself to danger to help the security forces.” In addition, some
residents go further and show support for those militants (“Egyptian civilians in crosshairs of
Sinai militants”, 2013).
Although, the state has been trying to conduct inclusion for the Bedouins post 2011, but
it seems that state was absent for decades, and other institutions such as extremist groups have
replaced it and made the state re-position in the society not a mild game.

4.2.2.3: The Prevalence of Corruption and Underground Economy: A Shift in the
Livelihood of People in North Sinai
The lack of physical presence of state and socio-economic underdevelopment situation
has created a prevalence of corruption and complex networks of underground economy.
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Bedouins in North Sinai started to resort to the underground economy as their main source of
income. This includes smuggling, black markets and human trafficking operations through
digging underground tunnels between North Sinai and Gaza Strip.
The Sawarka (extends in Al-Arish, Rafah, and Shaykh Zuweid cities), Tarabeen (the
most populous tribe and stretching across the Mediterranean coast) and Rumaylat tribes mainly
manage the smuggling operations. The commercial ties between the North Sinai Bedouins and
people in Gaza Strip were reinforced by historical, ethnic and linguistic ties (Pelham, 2012a, pp.
1-5; Gold, 2013, pp. 3-4). For instance, the Tarabeen tribe extends alongside the Egypt-Gaza
border. A Bedouin tribal leader said “We are 40 kilometers from Rafah, and 200 kilometers
from Cairo” (Pelham, 2012a, p. 1). Obviously, lack of state penetration into society has
introduced a new issue of control over borders.
Figure 10 - Map of Tribes in the Sinai Peninsula

Source: (Watanabe, 2015, p.2)

During the proliferation of the underground tunnels, the state was present, but was
corrupt. The Egyptian State Security Investigations Service (SSI) allowed the smugglers to
operate under the condition of having balanced relationship with the state authority. The state
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did not encounter this illegal underground economy; ironically, it encouraged the expansion of
this underground economy. The government sanctions on this underground economy were only
paying the full taxes and customs, and fine that never reached 2000 LE. In fact, this sanction
almost rarely applied due to the corruption of both low and high ranks of (SSI) officers who
were allowing this flow of underground trade. The smugglers bribed some of them as the
locations of many underground tunnels were under their control. According to interviews that
conducted by Mohanned Sabry with Bedouin smugglers such as Abu Arrab al- Sawarka, Abu
Suleiman Al-Tarabeen, and Mohamed Al-Filistini; all of them mentioned the same names of
SSI officers who were receiving bribes from the smugglers (Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108). A former
governor of North Sinai said, “The SSI left the smugglers and jihadists as part of a deal: we will
not harm you as long as you don’t harm us” (Personal communication, February 6, 2016). The
state perceived that using repression complemented by allowing the underground tunnels was
the most suitable approach of maintaining security in border area as the state found that from
2006 until 2011 the Sinai Peninsula was fully secured and free of terrorism (Sabry, 2015, pp.
85-108). Colonel Khaled Okasha argued that this pattern was significant to operate in a region
with extraordinary security situation controlled by a complex tribal system (Sabry, 2015, pp.
85-108). Hence, it is obvious that the state followed the traditional concept of national security
that includes the security sector only, rather than, the comprehensive concept that encompasses
not only the security sector, but also the social, economic, and political ones.
Shift in the Livelihood of People in North Sinai
Since the expansion and proliferation of the underground tunnels between North Sinai
and Gaza Strip in 2007, there was a real development in the livelihood of everyone in North
Sinai province. The underground tunnels transferred hundreds of millions from Gaza Strip to
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North Sinai province and extended to everyone in the province. Approximately, it is estimated
that the underground tunnels generated $650 million annually (Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108). The
price of shipment reached US $ 1,200 per one ton, and differs from one kind of product to
another. It helped everyone to get income from farmers to storage house owners’ retailers,
drivers, and wholesalers. Notably, due to the lack of development opportunities in North Sinai,
the Egyptian workers were less paid ($50 per shift) in comparison to the worker in Gaza Strip
($200 per shift) (Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108). In Rafah region, the unemployment rate was reduced
from 50% to 20%. Some frustrated youth in North Sinai became tunnel owners, and they
stopped complaining about lack of development and job opportunities. A Bedouin merchant in
Rafah said, “A decade ago, my whole clan had three cars, nowadays each household does”
(Pelham, 2012a, p. 4). In addition, the 200,000 estimated population in cities of Rafah, Sheikh
Zweyd, and Al-Arish started enhancing their livelihood conditions through building their own
villas, installing heavy-duty pumps, and building generators for lighting their own farms. The
populations become more relied on importing the modern agricultural equipment from Israel
rather than relying on the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture; they imported the know-how and
technologies from Gaza that already imported from Israel’s globally trustworthy agrarian
segment (Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108). Apparently, the underground tunnels transformed North
Sinai from an impoverished marginalized borderland into a zone of the flow of US dollars that
attracts unemployed people from all across Egypt.
Therefore, lack of psychical presence of the state as well as lack of control over borders
led to proliferation of underground economy that eroded further the state penetration into
society. Meanwhile, it seems that state was satisfied by the underground economy as it lifted a
heavy financial burden away from the state shoulder. The population and tribes were considered
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the most beneficiaries from these tunnels, and shut down of these tunnels created a threat to
their livelihood.

4.2.2.4: Social and Cultural Resistance to Penetration by State Institutions and
Ungovernability: State Legitimacy and Authority versus another Social Institutions
The North Sinai Bedouins are dissatisfied and perceive the Egyptian state as the fourth
colonizer after the Ottoman Empire, British occupation and Israel as they extract lots of
resources without achieving a real development in Sinai. Thus, there has been a social and
cultural resistance among Bedouins to penetration by state institutions in North Sinai society
(Joya, & Gormus, 2015, p. 52; K. Dawoud, personal communication, December 1, 2015; A.
Schleifer, personal communication, November 25, 2015). An incident shows the social and
cultural resistance of the state penetration into society by the Bedouins was when the state
opened the National Museum in Al-Arish to display ancient and Pharaonic history; this museum
was affronted by rejection by Bedouins, as this museum did not display any of Bedouins’
identity or history (Joya, & Gormus, 2015, p. 54). In February 2015, this museum was attacked
and damaged by the SPIS group (“Al-Arish National Museum damaged in Sinai attacks”,
2015). This incident reflects a clear example of social and cultural resistance to the state
institutions as well as gives an indicator that many of SPIS members are dissatisfied local
Bedouins.
Therefore, the social and cultural resistance to penetration by state institutions is among
the tribal society in North Sinai. The state never held legitimate authority over the peninsula,
but other social institutions. The case of North Sinai matches political science literature, when
there is no strong central government able to enforce the rule of law and provide security and
services, especially in the border areas, the other informal social institutions rise to conduct the
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‘gap-filling’ (Revkin, 2014, pp. 34-38).
State’s Proxy Governance: Tribal or Urf Law and Legitimacy of Tribal Leaders

The traditional form of social governance in North Sinai is the Tribal law’ or ‘Urf law,
which is enforced by the tribal leaders (Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108; Gold, 2013, p. 9). Based on
different interviews that are conducted by the researcher, it is found that the state never had
legitimacy among this tribal society. A former deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence
Directorate said “The police and judges represent nothing for Bedouins” (Personal
communication, March 13, 2016). The strength of Urf law exceeds the strength of the state law.
A former governor of North Sinai said, “if a Bedouin conducts an act against the law and
sentenced five years by the state law, this would not excuse him from fulfilling the tribal
jurisdiction, he should be presented in front of Urf jurisdiction also” (Personal communication,
February 6, 2016). The tribal leaders, those who keep law and order and the state was able to
conduct Proxy Governance in North Sinai through coordination with them, whom are appointed
by the Ministry of Interior (Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108; Gold, 2013, p.9) Notably, the Urf law does
not contradict with the state law, but it is complementary to it, and it is required in these spaces
where the state reach is weak (Revkin, 2014, pp. 34-38). Starting from the rule of Ottoman
Empire until the Egyptian rule, the central authorities cooperated with the Bedouins in keeping
law and order. The Egyptian state left the Urf law to prevail, and it was comfortable with it as it
used to appoint the tribal leaders and have strong relationship with them. After the terrorist
attacks during 2004-2006, the state went further and supported the Urf law, and gave salaries to
Urf judges, which made the Urf law more institutionalized.
The people should live in cities in order to be fully controlled by the state, but the
Bedouins live in villages, accordingly it is hard to control them. Hence, the Urf law system is
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considered a system, which helps the state to achieve its penetration. Notably, the tribal leader
does not encourage this violent extremism, and current militant insurgency challenges the tribal
system and structure (Revkin, 2014, pp. 34-38; Gold, 2014a, pp. 6-7 & Walton, Gerges, &
Gilbert, 2012, p. 7; Anonymous political researcher specialized in security studies, personal
communication, February 3, 2016). Therefore, the existence of tribal leaders or Urf law
represents the social institution that has more legitimacy over state legitimacy. Significantly, the
legitimacy of this institution helps state presence into society, but through proxy form of
governance.
Emergence of Smugglers as the New Tribal Elite
The rise of smuggling business in North Sinai has caused a shift in the tribal society, the
power and legitimacy of tribal leaders has eroded in favor of the new tribal elite ‘the smugglers’
who called themselves independent Sheikhs. The rise of smuggling has created brand new
powerful cadres among Bedouins who resemble in the hand of Bedouin smuggler clans. Those
new tribal smugglers’ elite have money, power, and weapons. Meanwhile, the power of the
tribal leaders has been eroded as the youth Bedouins started to perceive those tribal leaders as
appointed government officials who are not able to fulfill their needs. Therefore, those new
tribal smugglers elite was able to impose leverage on the youth Bedouins. (A former governor
of North Sinai, personal communication, February 6, 2016; Gold, 2014, p. 7; Z. Gold, personal
communication, December 2, 2015; Sabry, 2015, pp. 203-230; Anonymous EX-Radical
Islamist and Researcher specialized in the Islam Militant Movements, personal communication,
November 30, 2015).
Although, before the 2011 revolution, the state legitimacy was fragile and the state
governance was almost weak and corrupt, but it was able to govern North Sinai through the
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tribal leaders and Urf law. Post 2011 revolution the legitimacy and upper hand were neither in
the hands of the state nor Urf law, but it has become concentrated in hands of the new
smugglers elite.
Emergence of Non-State Sharia Courts of North Sinai
In addition to the rise of new smugglers tribal elite post 2011 revolution, there was a
change in North Society through the emergence of Islamic non-state Sharia courts that seized
more power and influence as a result of weakness of both Urf law and state legitimacy. These
courts are operated by Sinai Salafist Sheikhs (or Sharia judges as they describe themselves),
who reject the Egyptian legal system even under Mursi’s rule. They are self-appointed and selftrained; their ideology is based on Salafism, and their jurisdiction is based on the Sharia law.
Those Salafist judges operated underground between 1990s and 2000s through conflict
adjudication in private homes to avoid being arrested. Those courts started to emerge publicly
to introduce their service to the people and seized more power and influence after 2011
revolution; it is estimated that fourteen Sharia courts were established during 2011-2014. The
people in North Sinai started to resort to these courts instead of resorting to Urf judges or the
legal state court system, as the Bedouins perceived Sharia judges as less corrupt than the tribal
judges (Revkin, 2013, Revkin, 2015, pp. 11-16). An important active lawyer in Al-Arish said,
"Everyone is using Sharia courts" (Revkin, 2013). Although these courts lack the enforcement
mechanism, but since they are operating in a tribal society, they are using other powerful tools
such as social pressure and intimidation (Revkin, 2015, p. 11). Remarkably, these tools are
considered very effective in such tribal society based on collectivism principles.
Since 2013 and the initiation of the counter-terrorism campaign, the government
launched arrest campaigns against those Sharia judges, but they are still operating underground
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(Revkin, 2013). They reject June 30 revolution, and labeled it a “military coup”, and they
describe themselves as the protectors of democracy and rule of law (Revkin, 2015, pp. 41-44).
Those Sharia judges perceive the counter terrorism campaigns in North Sinai as an organized
state crime, and this would generate more revenge attitude against the government (Revkin,
2014, p. 40). Sheikh Hamdeen Abu Faisal, Sharia Judge said, “There is a long line of people
seeking revenge” (Revkin, 2014, pp. 43-44). Consequently, the counter terrorism campaigns
against Islamist led to the rise of Sharia judges’ aspiration for autonomously imposing the legal
order in Sinai (Revkin, 2014, pp. 43-44). Therefore, unlike the Urf law that does not encourage
this violent extremism, the rise of non-state Sharia courts erodes the state penetration into
society and facilitates the spread of radical ideology among North Sinai population and
subsequently increases the possibility of terror against the state.
Significantly, this kind of courts is an indicator of lack of state penetration to enforce
law and order in North Sinai. To clarify this point, in Somalia that is considered a failed state,
there is a large dominance of Sharia courts, but in comparison to North Sinai, it seems that the
Sharia courts in North Sinai are more powerful and institutionalized than the Sharia courts in
Somalia (Revkin, 2013). Accordingly, the emergence of these courts challenges the tribal
structure that represents the state proxy governance institution. Moreover, it fosters the level of
radicalization, which in turn increases the probability of terror against the state.
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Figure 11 - Social and Cultural Resistance to Penetration by State Institutions: State
Legitimacy and Authority versus another Social Institutions
Weakness of the Physical Presence of State and Relative
Deprivation of Bedouins
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Therefore, as it is shown in figure 11 that summarizes this section, the weakness of
physical presence of the state has caused relative deprivation among North Sinai population and
in turn eroded the government legitimacy. The only way out to govern North Sinai was by
proxy governance through empowering the tribal leaders who can impose order in the region.
By 2008-2009, there were political and economic changes in society through emergence of new
tribal smugglers elite and non-state Sharia courts that have caused erosion in the only powerful
institution that was able to govern ‘tribal leaders’. Hence, this increased the ungovernability
level.
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4.2.2.5: The Nexus between Selective State Penetration into North Sinai Society,
Relative Deprivation and Radicalization
The case of North Sinai reflects to a wide extent that the major cause of radicalization
and joining the extremist militant group is not solely due to poverty and relative deprivation, but
due to the feeling of relative deprivation combined with a selective state penetration that is
resembled in state repression. Exceptionally in some incidence, the use of violence against the
state in North Sinai could be as a result of the relative deprivation or state repression solely, but
commonly the use of violence by Bedouins against the state is as a result of combined relative
deprivation and state repression (see figure 12).
Figure 12 - The Nexus between Selective State Penetration into North Sinai Society,
Relative Deprivation and Radicalization
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According to the anthropological studies on the Sinai Bedouins community, the
dominant thought was either Sufism or atheism, but the Jihadism ideology did not exist. It is
even contradictory with the thoughts, tribal culture and values. The first two radicalized
Bedouins were the Bedouin dentist Khaled Messad (from Sawarka tribe) and Nasser al-Mallahi
who is Sinai-Palestinian; both formed Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad group (Sabry, 2015, pp. 125-130;
Yaari, 2012, p. 5l; “Al Tawhid Wal Jihad”, n.d.; “Tawhid Wal-Jihad”, 2014; International Crisis
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Group, 2007, p. 4). Due to lack of state penetration into society and relative deprivation among
youth Bedouins, Messad gained influence through preaching in mosques and promoting the
jihadi ideology; and succeeded to recruit around 40 Bedouins from his Masaaid clan, Tarabeen
tribe as well as from other impoverished villages in Sheikh Zwaid and Rafah that are
characterized by high level of unemployment and lack of basic services. In 2004, Al-Tawhid
Wal-Jihad group formed and conducted different terrorist attacks in 2004, 2005, and 2006 in
South Sinai (International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 4; International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 4;
Yaari, 2012, p. 5; Sabry, 2015, pp. 125-130).
Post the terrorist attacks of 2004, the state started to penetrate selectively in North Sinai
society through conducting state repression, in which the state has been trying to get authority
over the region through harsh security policies rather than confronting the radical ideologies and
conducting reconciliation, dialogue and integration of the region. The only presence of the state
was in form of state repression by the Egyptian State Security Investigations Service (SSI)
under the emergency law (Joya, & Gormus, 2015, pp. 52-53; Pelham, 2012a, p.2; Pelham,
2012b). The SSI started a massive campaign of arresting many people in North Sinai for a
period of time, and some claimed being tortured during the investigation as well as arresting
family members of suspected terrorists as means for obtaining confessions (Siboni & Barak,
2014, pp. 4-5; Gold, 2014, pp. 6-7; Pelham, 2012a, p. 3; Sabry, 2015, pp. 51-08). The Human
Rights Watch at that time condemned the massive arrest without judicial investigation that
estimated by 3,000 detainees from Rafah, Al-Arish, and Sheikh Zewaid (International Crisis
Group, 2007, p. 3-4). The state perceived that the suitable approach to deter any radical
ideology or future terror is through using state repression against North Sinai citizens. In fact,
this approach kept security in Sinai between 2007 to 2011, but it did not enhance the state
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penetration into society; ironically, the combined feeling of state repression and relative
deprivation has breaded more a sort of radicalization among population in North Sinai to get
revenge from the state (K. Dawoud, personal communication, December 1, 2015; O. Al-Salami,
personal communication, November 28, 2015; Siboni & Barak, 2014, p.4-5; Anonymous EXRadical Islamist and Researcher specialized in the Islam Militant Movements, personal
communication, November 30, 2015; T. Awaad, personal communication, December 3, 2015;
S. Hassan, November 30, 2015; K. Dawoud, personal communication, December 1, 2015; A
Former Deputy Head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate, personal communication, March
13, 2016).
The Salafism started to spread across North Sinai province, especially through the
emergence of Salafists leaders such as Sulaiman Abu Ayub and the Salfi associations in Rafah,
Sheikh Zewaid, and Bir Al-Abd. The Salafism started to appear among tribe members,
especially among youth. This was clear through the change in the society in the way they dress
and the disobedience by some youth to the tribal leaders. An anonymous Bedouin said, “Every
tribe and family in the Sinai saw a number of its youth joining these Salafi trends.” Those
radicalized Bedouins conducted boycott in dealing with the Egyptian government and officials,
and started to launch campaign to promote the Jihadi ideology (Yaari, 2015, p. 5).
Following the outbreak of 2011 revolution, the selective state penetration that was
resembled in SSI collapsed and this jihadi ideology has transformed into terror against the state.
However, the population all across Egypt used violence against the police during 2011, but
North Sinai was among the top places that witnessed violence as a result of frustration,
marginalization, and use of emergency law (A. Sakr, personal communication, November 11,
2015; Sabry, 2015, pp. 1-30; Z. Gold, personal communication, December 2, 2015). Many
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armed Bedouins conducted violent acts in Al-Arish city, blocked roads, and participated in gas
pipeline bombing. The state penetration into society has been eroded due to the collapse of SSI,
and many spaces like Wadi Amr and Jabal al-Halal turned into defense bases for extremist
Bedouins, especially for those extremist Bedouins who escaped during the prison break in 2011
and had already interacted with a lot of jihadists in the prison; among them the former leader of
ABM, Tawfiq Farqik Ziada from Sawarka tribe (Al-Yaari, 2012; p.8 A. Sakr, personal
communication, November 11; Anonymous EX-Radical Islamist and Researcher specialized in
the Islam Militant Movements, personal communication, November 30, 2015). The economic
targeting of gas pipeline by Bedouins resembled a clear case of the relative deprivation. The
security guard of the gas pipeline in North Sinai said that there were five masked men and the
one who spoke has a native Bedouin accent by saying, “This has nothing to do with you, leave
right now, or you will be shot” (Sabry, 2015, pp. 31-50). Moreover, a tribal elder said that it is
impossible for a stranger to conduct these terrorists attacks with the help of local Bedouins; he
said, “I am confident that no stranger can come here, reach the control chambers in small towns,
and bomb them without being spotted; they were helped by locals who knew their way around
the desert and towns” (Sabry, 2015, pp. 31-50). Thus, both the relative deprivation and selective
state penetration have caused radicalization among some Bedouins, which resulted in the terror
against the Egyptian state.
The initiation of the counter-terrorism campaign post July 2013 has represented another
phase of the state repression and selective state penetration. The Bedouins have been suffering
from suspicious treatment by the security forces. A Bedouin from Al-Sawarka tribe said,
“Everyone from Rafah and Sheikh Zewaid in the eye of army is a terrorist, unless you prove the
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opposite” (Personal communication, February 4, 2016).

Moreover, the counter terrorism

campaign closed the underground tunnels that represented the main source of Bedouins income.
The expansion of buffer zone in Rafah and demolishment of citizens’ houses and
cultivated lands have intensified the feeling of relative deprivation among the inhabitants as the
demolishment made no distinction between the houses that operate tunnels and others that are
free of tunnels. Thousands of inhabitants left their homes, and some of them resorted to live in
tents until they receive their compensation and find an alternative housing. Almost all
inhabitants are not satisfied as many of them did not receive the compensation, and those who
received it found that it is not adequate to buy a new house in Al-Arish city. Moreover, the
increase of demand on housing by the displaced inhabitants in Rafah has increased the housing
prices. Additionally, the government does not compensate the people for the cultivated lands as
it considered them as empty lands. Many people suffer loss of source of income that is
connected to their place, especially those who cultivated lands (Houry & Porteous, 2015). Two
Bedouins from Al-Sawrka tribe said that the inhabitants are very upset from the military policy
and demolishment of their houses; the compensations are extremely low in comparison to their
houses’ prices. In addition, they suffer from the tough procedures to receive the compensation
(Personal communication, February 4, 2016; Y. Werdany, personal communication, February 3,
2015).
Moreover, the military conducts random airstrikes that hurt civilians in different cases;
for instance, the military operation in July 2015 destroyed different civilian properties and
killed six civilians (El-Fekki, Fahmy, & Nader, 2015; Mehmood, 2015, pp. 13-14). A Bedouin
woman called Nimaa said that her husband was killed by the army, and he was not a militant or
part of any terrorist organization (Reuters/Stringer, 2014, p. 3). On the contrary, a military
67

officer said “Some innocents die but at the hands of terrorists not us” (Reuters/Stringer, 2014, p.
4). Therefore, it seems that counter terrorism campaign represents a new phase of selective state
penetration that revived the feeling of relative deprivation and selective state penetration into
society.
The selective state penetration post July 2013 through the counter terrorism campaign
increased the feeling of revenge and relative deprivation. A Bedouin teacher from Sawarka
tribe said, “Radicalization is prevalent among youth, you could see in one house or one member
supports the army and another one supports the extremist militants” (Personal communication,
February 4, 2016). These extremist militant groups are able to conduct recruitment from Sinai
youth Bedouins, especially from Sawarka and Tarabeen tribes (“Confessions of arrested
terrorists in the Sinai”, 2013; “Confession of the traitor Ahmed Salama about his work with the
terrorists”, 2015; Hassan, Bayoumy, & Woods, 2015, p. 6; M. Salah, personal communication,
November 30, 2015; S. Issac, personal communication, December 8, 2015; Y. Werdany,
personal communication, February 3, 2015). An anonymous security officer in North Sinai said
that a militant during interrogating him said that he participated in violence against the security
forces, as he wanted to take revenge from the security forces (Georgy & Woods, 2015, p.5).
Before the initiation of the counter terrorism campaign, an anonymous Bedouin witnessed only
five people in his village fight for SPIS, but after the counter terrorism campaign that almost
destroyed 90% of his village, he witnessed around 40 members fight for SPIS (Schenker, 2015,
pp. 6-7). Although, it is clear that the counter terrorism killed and arrested many militants, but it
has expanded the state enemies and established a base of recruitment where the militants can
employ many repressed Bedouins.
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In some cases, the economic relative deprivation is the only factor that is related to
recruitment. According to different residents of North Sinai and security officials, the leaders of
terrorist groups offer the young recruits wives, houses and money (Reuters/Stringer, 2014, p. 4).
A Bedouin teacher from Sawarka tribe said, “The militants used the poverty situation to recruit
youth Bedouins to place the bombs, those youth are not radicalized, but like drug addicts and
criminals, they do that for money only” (Personal communication, February 4, 2016). One of
the confessions by a Bedouin terrorist does not seem to be radicalized, called Ahmed Faraj
Alkika said, “ I have been working with militant groups for nine months and half with salary for
working 12 hours per day of 10,000 Egyptian Pounds monthly” (“Confessions Ahmed Faraj
Alkika about his work with terrorists in Sheikh Zuweid, 2015). Moreover, the SPIS group asked
the harmed citizens to join the fight the militants groups, and they have been offering them
money and donations and promise to get revenge from the military that destroyed their property
(Anonymous EX-radical Islamist and researcher specialized in the Islam militant movements,
personal communication, November 30, 2015; Shay, 2016, p. 3).
Therefore, the extremist militant groups, especially SPIS is effectively offering the
deprived and suppressed youth Bedouins an identity and membership, and a mean to achieve
their goals, that it could be money, identity, revenge from the state or all of it. This kind of
selective state penetration does not enhance the security situation; ironically, it increases the
probability of terror to occur.

4.2.3: Third Dimension: Control over Borders in North Sinai
As North Sinai is considered a border region, the control over borders is more complex
than any other hinterland in Egypt due to its geographical proximity to conflict zone, blockade
region, old rival state actor to the Arab, and above all inhabited by an extended tribal society
69

over borders. Furthermore, the control of over North Sinai borders is a real challenge, as the
state penetration into society and monopoly on the use of force are fragile. Between 2007 and
2013, the control over borders between Sinai and Gaza Strip was very fragile, especially post
2011 revolution. The Egyptian state started to regain control over the borders since mid-2013.

4.2.3.1: Borderland Fragility between 2007-2013
The death of Yasser Arafat, withdrawal of Israel from Gaza Strip, and winning of
Hamas in the 2006 elections that followed by imposition a blockade over Gaza Strip had
introduced a new turning point in losing control over borders through the flourishing of
underground tunnels between Gaza Strip and North Sinai province. Significantly, all these were
facilitated by weakness of state penetration into society. Historically, the establishment of the
first underground tunnel between Gaza and Sinai took place in 1983, immediately after the
Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Practically, the underground tunnels started to emerge on a small
scale since 1997 to smuggle jewelry and narcotics and rarely smuggling weapons (Sabry, 2015,
pp. 85-108). These tunnels were not significant for the population in Gaza as the Israeli
controlled-crossings were operating (Pelham, 2012a, pp. 10-14; Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108).
Following 2007, the legal Rafah crossing between Sinai and Gaza has become one of the most
important means for Gaza daily life needs, and shortly the government started to accuse Hamas
of supporting the militant groups in Sinai and using the Peninsula as a space for the missiles
testing (Pelham, 2012a, pp. 10-14). Afterwards, the Egyptian government started to restrict the
movement through the Rafah crossing in 2008. Consequently, the extended tribes started to
develop trade and commercial ties with North Sinai Bedouins through constructing
underground tunnels (Pelham, 2012a, pp. 10-14).
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Figure 13 – Number of the Underground Tunnels between Gaza and North Sinai (2007-2013)
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As it is shown in figure 13, until the mid of 2007, the underground tunnels did not
exceed 20 tunnels. Following the statement of the co-founder of Hamas, Mahmoud Al-Zahar,
“We had to build the tunnels since no electricity, water or food is coming from outside” (Sabry,
2015, pp. 85-108), the number of underground tunnels increased rapidly and reached 700
tunnels in 2008 including 200 under construction (Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108). By the end of
2010, the number tunnels reached 1,200 and became the main gate of Gaza for imports
(Pelham, 2012a, pp. 10-11; Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108). By October 2013, the total number of
tunnels reached 1900 roughly (Shay, 2016, p. 2). The first tunnels started by 150 to 300 meters,
but later some tunnels reached 1,500 meters long and 2 meters wide (Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108).
Basically, two kinds of underground tunnels were developed. The main tunnels are
considered the economic tunnels used to bring commodities, heavy construction materials and
raw materials from Egypt to Gaza. The second complex type of underground tunnels were used
by Hamas to protect itself through hiding stockpile of rockets and launchers as well as
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smuggling weapons through Sinai to Gaza (Eldar, 2014; Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108). Since 2008,
Hamas took control of these underground tunnels, a department at the ministry of interior
responsible about the tunnels’ management called Tunnels Affairs Commission. In fact, Hamas
relied heavily on the smuggled weapons to build its armed arsenal through the underground
tunnels between Gaza and Sinai, but it never involved itself directly in the smuggling operation,
while it left the operation to be conducted by the smugglers in southern Gaa; in return, Hamas
protects them. Hamas mainly imposed taxes and duties on the imported products, and the tax
value differed from one commodity to another, and banned smuggling drugs and ammunition;
and it set a fine for those who did not abide by these rules. This newly department was
responsible to give licenses for these tunnels (Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108).
Before 2011 revolution, the main source of the smuggled weapons was coming from
Sudan to Sinai through Iranian support. This support includes weapon manufacturing and
allocating budget to secure the transportation of these weapons from Sudan to Sinai. The
presence of Omar Al-Bashir as an Islamist President as well as the criminal networks of armed
smugglers facilitated the movements of arms smuggling from Sudan into Upper Egypt, then to
Sinai, and through the underground tunnels into Gaza (Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108). The increase
of level of Iranian support to Gaza by arms smuggling through Sudan was translated in Israeli
air strike of Yarmouk weaponry factory in Sudan in October 2012; as Israel claimed to be a
source of weapons smuggled to Gaza. At that time, Ali Akbar Salehi the Iranian foreign
minister – said, “Let’s assume that Iran has established an arms factory in the Sudan. Is this
forbidden? Within the framework of international laws, if there is a country that wants to buy
weapons from us, we are ready” (Dyer, & Kessler, 2014, pp. 18-19).
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By the eruption 2011 revolution, the arms smuggling sources extended to not only
include Sudan but also Libya (Pelham, 2012a, p. 4). The arms traffickers smuggled weapons
through the Egyptian crossing at Al-Salloum by bribing the security officers, by road to Sinai,
and through the underground tunnels to Gaza (“Hamas – the increase of terrorism against Israel
and the ongoing strengthening”, n.d.). A former deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence
Directorate said “The state was very weak to control the borders before and after the revolution”
(A Former Deputy Head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate, personal communication,
March 13, 2016).
However, the normal path of weapons smuggling had been from Sinai to Gaza, but after
the Egyptian revolution in 2011, the weapons smuggling route was sometimes reversed from
Gaza to Sinai as there was a huge demand from the extremist militants who have been operating
in North Sinai (Yaari, 2012, p. 6). The tunnels helped militants to transfer and store weapons as
well as hide inside it as part of guerrilla warfare (Anonymous EX-radical Islamist and
researcher specialized in the Islam militant movements, personal communication, November 30,
2015; Z. Gold, personal communication, December 2, 2015; Hassan, Bayoumy, & Woods,
2015, p. 3).
In 2009 (under pressure of US and Israel) and in early August 2012, Egypt started to
raid the tunnels, but both campaigns were totally ineffective to destroy the tunnels, as the
tunnels were more sophisticated, longer and deeper than the campaign targeted (Gold, 2014, pp.
12-13; Dyer & Kessler, 2014, p. 18). A former governor of North Sinai said, “The state did not
allow the smuggling operations, at the time I was the Commander of the Egyptian Border
Guards Force, and we destroyed every tunnel we knew, but the problem is that tunnels were
developed and built inside private houses of Bedouins, and it was hard to discover them”
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(Personal communication, February 6, 2016). Thus, this does not solely reflect the degree of
lack of the Egyptian state control over borders, but it shows as well lack of psychical presence
of state that pushed the citizens to resort to the underground economy that in turn led to
weakness of state penetration into society and weakness of control over borders.
Moreover, as the underground tunnels have become a vital source of funding of the
militant groups due to their participation into the smuggling operation (Sabry, 2015, pp. 85108), those aforementioned dates of the counter terrorism campaigns against the tunnels raise a
question regarding the rise of terror after these two raids. However, there was no terror until
2011 as the militants were not well established enough at that time, but immediately after the
counter terrorism campaign against the tunnels in early August 2012, the terrorist attacks
increased from 3 attacks in June-July 2012 to 26 attacks in August-September 2012 (see figure
2).

4.2.3.2: Re-Assuming Control over Borders Post October 2013
Since October 2013, after the sharp increase in the terrorist attacks, the state started to
resume the control over borders through declaring the state of emergency and expanding the
buffer zone between Sinai and Gaza to more 500 meters, to be one kilometer as a buffer zone in
order to find out and destroy the extensive infrastructure of tunnels and remove any shelter for
the militants (Reuters, 2014; Schweitzer, 2015, p.2; Shay, 2016, p. 2). Between July 2013 and
August 2015, the establishment of the buffer zone led to demolishment of 3,225 residential,
commercial, administrative, and community buildings along the border with Gaza. Moreover,
the military removed 685 hectares of cultivated land (Houry & Porteous, 2015, p. 1). If this
buffer zone expanded to 1.5 km, it would mean an evacuation of Rafah city (Houry & Porteous,
2015). By the end of 2015, the establishment of the buffer zone enabled the state to destroy
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1900 tunnels through filling the tunnels with sewage and sea water, and using enormous
quantities of explosives for the iron tunnels (Shay, 2016, pp. 3-4). It seems that the state
extensively controlled the tunnels, but still the iron tunnels represent a challenge to control the
borders. Furthermore, the state issued a new law of life imprisonment to those who built any
tunnels (Shay, 2016, pp. 3-4). However, the state claims control over the tunnels, two
anonymous Bedouins from Sawarka tribe confirmed in February 2016 that some tunnels are
still operating for commodities under the knowledge of the Egyptian army, and the monetary
and arms smuggling are still running through bribing some of the low rank army officers (A
Bedouin teacher from Al-Sawarka tribe and a prominent member in a developmental NGO
based in North Sinai, personal communication, February 4, 2016; A prominent member of AlSawarka tribe, personal communication, February 4, 2016)
Apparently, the control over borders seems as a challenge to be controlled solely by
Egypt, but one of the most important indicators of control over borders is its ability to
coordinate with the neighboring authorities ‘Hamas and Israel’. Based on a different set of
interviews conducted by the researcher, it found that there is an agreement that there has been
an unprecedented coordination between Israel and Egypt since July 2013 as both under threat
from the extremist militant groups. As Israeli official put it “We coordinate when it comes to
activities near the (border) fence in order to prevent terrorist attacks potentially spreading into
Israel” (Georgy & Woods, 2015, p. 4). Meanwhile, it is found unprecedented weakness of
cooperation between Egypt and Hamas in securing borders since July 2013, as Egypt considers
Hamas an extension of its enemy “Muslim Brotherhood. A former deputy head of the Egyptian
Intelligence Directorate said, “There is no coordination with Hamas as it keeps threatening
Egypt’s national security (Personal communication, March 13, 2016). Moreover, it seems that
75

the war against the tunnels has deteriorated further Hamas-Egypt relations. Specifically, raiding
tunnels puts legitimacy of Hamas in Gaza under doubts, as it would not be able to deliver goods
to Gaza citizens, as it was able to deliver under the period of proliferation of underground
tunnels.
Therefore, the weakness of control over borders is a result of weakness of state
penetration into society and lack of monopoly on the use of force. However, the state started to
resume control over borders since July 2013, but the weakness to control borders between 2007
and 2013 increased the level of ungovernability through increasing the level of armament of the
local militants group as well as opened the floor for external interference by different non-state
actors to gain leverage and power in North Sinai province.

4.2.4: Fourth Dimension: External Interference
Basically, external interference dimension in North Sinai is a direct result of lack of the
state penetration, control over borders, and monopoly on the use of force. North Sinai
geographic location has played a vital role in easing the external interference. The external
influence of Israel through 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty has placed restrictions of Egyptian
monopoly on the use of force. Terrorism in North Sinai seems to be local terrorism, but the
external interference by non-state actors has escalated the level and intensity of terrorism.
Although the external interference requires fragile internal environment to operate within as the
situation in North Sinai, but it also requires either conflict neighboring countries, unstable
regional conditions or both as the case of North Sinai showed. The external interference in
North Sinai has been occurring through ideological, economic, social, and military leverage by
different non-state actors from Gaza Strip. Moreover, the external interference has become not
only limited to Gaza Strip, but it has expanded to other actors due to the Middle East regional
76

security crisis and rise of many of the extremist groups, and most importantly the Islamic State
terrorist group.

4.2.4.1: External Influence of Israel: Restrictions of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty
1979 on the Monopoly on the Use of Force
The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979 is a cross-section indictor between both the
external interference and monopoly on the use of force dimensions. Specifically, this treaty
represents a clear indicator of external influence by Israel. Meanwhile, it has placed restrictions
on the Egyptian state monopoly on the use force.
This treaty has provided Israel with a military leverage over Sinai territory; in return,
has placed restrictions on the presence of the Egyptian armed forces in the Sinai Peninsula
through allowing only limited amount of troops and demilitarization of large of parts of Sinai.
According to the Peace Treaty and as it is shown on the map below (figure 14), the Sinai
Peninsula is divided into zone A, B, and C. Zone A is very close to Egypt’s mainland, bounded
by the Suez Canal from the west and Zone B from the East (Watanabe, 2015, p. 4). In this zone,
Egypt can only deploy one mechanized infantry of some 20,000 troops (Israel-Egypt Peace
Treaty, 1979). Zone B is considered the largest zone where Egypt can deploy “three
mechanized infantry brigades, one armed brigade, seven field artillery battalions including up to
126 artillery pieces, seven anti-aircraft artillery battalions including individual surface-to-air
missiles and up to 126 anti-aircraft guns of 37 mm, 230 tanks, up to 480 armored personnel
vehicles of all types, up to a total of twenty-two thousand personnel”. This zone shall not
contain more 4000-border security battalions, with no more 4,000 personnel equipped with light
weapons and wheeled vehicles and supported by civil police. These troops are characterized by
low power; land based, and short range (“Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty”, 1979). Zone C is a
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demilitarized zone; the Egyptian military troops cannot be deployed in this area, only the
Egyptian civil police and Multinational Forces and Observers (MFO); Egypt, Israel, US, and
other contributor countries fund these MFO troops (Watanabe, 2015, p. 4). After the Israeli
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005, renegotiation was conducted between Egypt and Israel,
and both agreed to allow Egypt in deployment of 750 military personnel in order to strength the
control over Gaza-Sinai borders that it is estimated by 14 kilometers (International Crisis
Group, 2007, p. 6). Zone D is a zone within the Israeli territory that can deploy up to four
infantry battalions, and they consist of 180 armored personnel vehicles with all kinds and up to
4000 personnel (“Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty”, 1979).

Figure 14 - Demilitarized Zones on the Sinai since 1979

Source: (Watanabe, 2015)

The Egyptian military counter terrorism campaign post ousting former President Morsi
has manifested an increase in the monopoly on the use of force. The increase of terrorist attacks
by the extremist militants has led to increase in the coordination between Israel and Egypt,
which enabled Egypt to deploy large amount of weapons that are banned by the Peace Treaty in
Sinai. In 2014, an Israeli official quoted by Times saying “in practice, the military annex of the
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Treaty is nonexistent” (Aronson, 2015). For instance, Egypt was allowed to deploy other
infantry battalions, tanks, helicopters, including the Apache that flies over the demilitarized
zone C (Dyer, & Kessler, 2014, pp. 19-21).
Based on different interviews that were conducted by the researcher, it is found that
there is no consensus regarding the impact of the peace treaty on flourishing the terrorism in
North Sinai. One side argues that the absence of adequate military forces in Sinai allowed the
extremist militant groups to flourish and use this space to operate with fewer restrictions.
Moreover, the militants used Sinai to fight Israel and direct allegations to Egypt of allying with
Israel “the enemy of Arab” and this definitely facilitated the recruitment process from youth
Bedouins by the militant groups. (EX-radical Islamist and researcher specialized in the Islam
militant movements, personal communication, November 30, 2015; O. Al-Salami, personal
communication, November 28, 2015; Anonymous political researcher specialized in security
studies, personal communication, February 3, 2016; A female human rights activist and resident
in North Sinai, personal communication, November 30, 2015; T. Awaad, personal
communication, December 3, 2015). The other side argues that the Egyptian-Israeli Peace
Treaty in 1979 is not related to terrorism as the police is the security institution responsible to
crackdown the militant groups not the military, especially both the General and Military
Intelligence institutions can support the civil police in this task (Z. Gold, personal
communication, December 2, 2015; K. Dawoud, personal communication, December 1, 2015;
A Former Governor of North Sinai, personal communication, February 6, 2016; A Former
Deputy Head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate, personal communication, March 13,
2016). On the same side, a former deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate said,
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“Practically the state lost part of its sovereignty over Sinai and has nothing to do with the Peace
Treaty” (Personal communication, March 13, 2016).
In regard to both arguments; however, it seems that suppressing the militants is
primarily the civil police responsibility, but it is obvious that the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty
presents a clear case of the external interference in the Egyptian space when it placed vast
restrictions on the state monopoly on use of force; in return, it has created long-term repressions
in transforming Sinai into a safe haven for the extremist militant groups.

4.2.4.2: Non-State Actors in Gaza Strip and Geographical Proximity to Conflict Zone
The first external interference was resembled by Gaza extremist militant groups in
Southern Gaza that succeeded in imposing their ideological leverage over some Bedouins due
to the cultural and social linkage. In 2009, many members of Gaza extremist militant groups
such as the Jaish Al-Islam group were oppressed and pushed by Hamas to leave the Gaza Strip;
they moved to North Sinai, where they were able to operate and attack Israel several times more
freely from Sinai without pressure from Hamas and Israel, with the understanding that Israel
will not interfere militarily and fight them in Sinai due to the Peace Treaty (Sabry, 2015, pp. 85108; Pelham, 2012a, p. 13; Yaari, 2012, p. 6). Due to lack of state penetration, those extremists
were able to hide among citizens, especially in the villages that are away from the state reach.
The existence of extremist Bedouins in the poor villages of North Sinai fostered the Gaza
extremists’ safety through providing them by a safe haven in their villages (Sabry, 2015, pp.
132-133). The influence of Gaza’s extremists was clear on some Sinai Bedouins starting from
2010, in which the Sinai extremist started to preach with radical discourse in mosques of
villages surrounding Sheikh Zwaid and Rafah. Al-Filistini said, “There was nothing to counter
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the radical rhetoric in Sinai, and they weren’t preaching to doctors and engineers” (Sabry, 2015,
pp. 132-133).
Notably, those extremists arrived two years before the rise of terrorism in 2011, but
throughout those two years, the Gaza extremists succeeded in achieving an impact of spreading
their ideologies and cause radicalization that has transformed into terror against the state post
2011 revolution. Moreover, the increase of ungovernability post 2011 revolution was an
opportunity exploited by both Sinai and Gaza extremists to conduct many terrorist attacks
(“Confessions of arrested terrorists in the Sinai”, 2013). Moreover, there are extremist militant
groups based in both Sinai and Gaza such as Majlis Shura Al-Mujahideen (MSM) as well as
Jaish Al-Islam that trained some Egyptian Jihadists and was blamed in 2012 of conducting cross
border attack that killed 16 soldiers (“Jaish Al-Islam”, 2014; Dyer & Kessler, 2014, pp. 35- 41;
Gold, 2014,p. 9; “Majlis Shura al-Mujahedeen”, n.d.; Maloof, 2013; Aftandilian, 2015, pp. 1415; Shay, 2014, pp. 3-4).
The second external interference is resembled in Hamas that was able to impose its
economic and military leverage over North Sinai Bedouins; especially, this was empowered by
the historical and common family ties. It is estimated that 1/3 of Gaza population are Bedouins,
and many of Bedouins are among the leadership of Hamas. Moreover, large numbers of
Palestinians and Hamas leaders have the Egyptian nationality such as Mahmoud Al-Zahar
(Pelham, 2012a, p.10; Sabry, 2015, pp. 51-84).
Economically, Hamas succeeded to control the main income source of inhabitants of
North Sinai, which made the citizens fully dependent on the underground tunnels. The
economic benefits and clan interests allowed Hamas to make the smugglers more loyal to it as it
is the reason behind their wealth (Pelham, 2012a, p.10; Sabry, 2015, pp. 51-84).
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Militarily, Hamas used Sinai as a strategic depth to store its arsenal and assets as well as
test missiles far away from Israeli monitoring. Hamas has different secret storages in the Sinai
that include Grad rockets and extended-range Qassams. It was estimated in 2012 that 100,000
weapons pieces of all sorts were stored in North Sinai (Yaari, 2012, pp. 6-7). According to
Omar Suliman’s testimony in Mubarak’s trial, the prison break of January 2011 that led escape
of 23,710 prisoners was a result of a deal between Hamas and North Sinai Bedouins of
supplying those Bedouins by weapons, in return they help Hamas to free the Hamas imprisoned
members (Sabry, 2015, pp. 179-202). Among those prisoners, there were Egyptian jihadists
including Bedouins who took Jabel Al-Halal Mountain in North Sinai as a safe haven and
started to operate and conduct terrorist attacks against the state (Tuitel, 2013; Said & Elkady,
2013, p.5). However, Hamas did not conduct terrorist attacks against Egypt, but its interference
has increased the ungovernability level in North Sinai, which in return facilitated the escalation
of terror.

4.2.4.3: The Regional Dimension and Escalation of Terrorism in North Sinai
The external interference post the Arab Spring has expanded to not solely include the
Gaza non-state actors, but also other extremist militant groups from the Middle East region.
Based on the different interviews that were conducted by the researcher, it is found that there is
a consensus that the regional conditions have shared in escalating terrorism in North Sinai, and
transforming terrorism for being local into transnational terrorism.
The eruption of the Arab spring has created a regional security crisis; it is found that
North Sinai was sharply affected by this crisis. First, there was a fall down of the authoritarian
and totalitarian regimes that were formerly able to suppress those extremist militant groups.
Second, there was a fall down of intelligence institutions that previously were coordinating with
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Egyptian intelligence. Hence, all these have facilitated the flourishing, movement, training and
armament of those extremist in the region as well recruitment of new members under the slogan
of ‘Jihad for the sake of Allah’ with less oppression in spaces such as North Sinai (Siboni &
Barak, 2014, p. 7; “Regional influence on terrorism in Egypt”, 2015).
Moreover, the crisis of the Middle regional security post the Arab Spring has created a
fragile border security in the Arab world, in which it eased weapons smuggling across the
borders as the anti-smuggling measures collapsed (“Regional influence on terrorism in Egypt”,
2015; Pelham, 2012a, p.11). The collapse of Gaddafi’s regime and the division of the Libyan
army have created many ungoverned spaces, especially in the western part near the EgyptianLibyan borders, in which it has become a safe haven for terrorists training and arms smuggling
to the Egyptian territory (“Regional influence on terrorism in Egypt”, 2015). Many weapons fell
into the hands of smugglers and criminals who exploited the opportunity to sell weapons to
Hamas and Islamic extremist groups through Al-Sallom crossing by bribing the Egyptian
soldiers, moving to Sinai, and then to Gaza through tunnels. The chaos all over Libya and
especially in the western ungoverned space with the Egyptian border helped the smugglers to
transfer large amounts of weapons (Sabry, 2015, pp. 51-84; Pelham, 2012ab, p. 3; Pelham,
2012a, p. 11). These weapons included light and heavy weapons such as automatic and sniper
rifles, high-calibers, anti-aircraft missiles SA-24s, RPGs and landmines. In addition to
smuggling of multi-barrel rocket launchers, Toyota trucks formfitting with anti-aircraft guns on
the back, luxury cars, satellite phones, the Internet devices, handheld transceivers, and army
uniforms to North Sinai (Sabry, 2015, pp. 51-84; Pelham, 2012ab, p. 3). In the center of Rafah
city in Sinai, there is a popular market convened every Saturday; it witnessed in 2011 selling
large amounts of Libyan weapons by Bedouins, and became known by ‘Misrata’ market (Sabry,
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2015, pp. 51-84). The Sudanese source of arms smuggling was almost replaced by the Libyan
source, as the route from Libya is much safer and less costly than African route (Sabry, 2015,
pp. 51-84).
The Middle East regional security crisis has resulted in movement of many foreign
militants to North Sinai. According to different foreign intelligence institutions, there are
foreign fighters from Somalia, Yemen, Algeria, Libya, Afghanistan, Syria, and Eastern Mali to
Sinai who shared their experience with the radicalized local Bedouins (Siboni & Barak, 2014, p.
7; O. Al-Salami, personal communication, November 28, 2015; A. Al-Mashat, personal
communication, November 29, 2015). Following the ouster of Morsi, it was believed that a new
flow of foreign militants arrived to Sinai (Siboni & Barak, 2014, pp. 7-8) and calling for a war
against the Egyptian security forces, which resulted in 174 terrorists attacks (See figure 2)
within two months after Morsi’s ouster (Siboni & Barak, 2014, pp. 7-8). Moreover, many of
Egyptian extremist who fought in Syria estimated roughly by the Egyptian authorities to be
3,000 who travelled to Syrian in 2012 under the MB rule as well as from Libya who returned
back to Egypt to represent a new trained extremist generation who transferred their jihadi
experience to SPIS (Awad & Hashem, 2015, p. 21; “Regional influence on terrorism in Egypt”,
2015). A police officer serves in North Sinai said some militants are foreigners who received
training in Syria (Georgy & Woods, 2015, p. 5). Those militants clearly appear in Al-Qaeda in
the Sinai Peninsula (AQSP), Ansar al-Jihad and Jund Al-Islam groups that are operating in
North Sinai and ideologically affiliated to Al-Qaeda (Dyer & Kessler, 2014, pp. 43 44). Hence,
the flow of extremist to Sinai improved the training level of the local extremist, especially the
training of recruiting new fighters (“Regional influence on terrorism in Egypt”, 2015).

84

Unlike the traditional ideological link with Al-Qaeda state, in 2014 ABM (the most
active local group in North Sinai) has pledged alliance to the Islamic (IS) through releasing a
statement saying, “In accordance with the teachings of the Prophet, we announce our allegiance
to the Caliphate, and call on Muslims everywhere to do the same” (Abdo, 2014). Afterwards, it
shifted its name from Ansar Beit Al-Maqdas (ABM) to the Sinai Province of the Islamic State
(SPIS) or Wilayat Sinai (“Ansar Beit al-Maqdis”, 2015). One week later, Al-Baghdadi
confirmed the alliance and announced that the Caliphate has expanded to Sinai (Bunzel, 2015,
p. 32). Shortly, it has adopted the same black flag of the IS group, follows its same tactics as
beheading of captives, and produces high quality edited videos (Anonymous, 2014), and above
all it presents videos of controlling lands that reflects its intention to govern as the IS acts.
In the very beginning, the majority of SPIS members were Bedouins, especially from
Tarabeen tribe and Masaaid clan in Sawarka tribe as well as other extremists from different
Egyptian regions, but they started to include also extremist from the Gaza Strip, Afghanistan,
Libya, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Sudan and Somalia (Dentice, & Paolo, 2014, pp.
78-80; Kovac & Guertin, 2013, p. 2). Moreover, it is argued that some of them joined the group
by instructions of the Islamic State (Schweitzer, 2015, pp. 1-2).
However, ABM was willing to align with Al-Qaeda, but the IS group provided logistical
support, training, and weapons more than Al-Qaeda did (A. Sakr, personal communication,
November 11, 2015; Lister, 2016, p. 16). It is confirmed that SPIS received financial and
weaponry support from IS via the Gulf of Aqaba, Jordan, Syria through the Mediterranean Sea,
and with minor scale from the underground tunnels (A former deputy head of the Egyptian
Intelligence Directorate, personal communication, March 13, 2016; A Former Governor of
North Sinai, personal communication, February 6, 2016; A. Sakr, personal communication,
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November 11, 2015). Other sources also added that the support is transferred through Sudan
and Libya (“Regional influence on terrorism in Egypt”, 2015). A former deputy head of the
Egyptian Intelligence Directorate said, “It is very easy to smuggle money or weapons (Personal
communication, March 13, 2016).
Clearly, the external interference and regional dimension have led to escalation of
terrorism intensity in North Sinai. According to figure 1, there has been an escalation of
terrorism since October-December 2014, which coincides with the declaration of ABM alliance
to the IS group. Moreover, according to figure 14 that represents number of terrorists by
extremist militant groups, during October-December 2014, there was a rise of SPIS terrorist
attacks, and a decline of the share of other groups’ terrorist attacks. For instance, between
January-March 2013, there were only six attacks, ABM claimed one, and the other five attacks
claimed by other different groups; while between October-December 2015, there were 82
attacks, SPIS claimed 73 attacks, and nine by other different groups. Additionally, since
declaring alliance to the IS, the most complex terrorist activities were conducted by SPIS. As an
illustration, since 2011, SPIS conducted the most sophisticated attacks in North Sinai. For
instance, in July 2015, SPIS attacked 21 security facilities and checkpoints simultaneously that
resulted in the death of dozens of Egyptian security forces. Moreover, it claimed responsibility
for bombing the Russian plane in Sinai that was carrying 224 passengers (“Wilayat Sinai - The
Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy”, n.d.).
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Figure 15 - Number of Attacks by Extremist Militant Groups (2013-2015)
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Most notably, according to figure 16 (percentage of attacks by extremist militant
groups), the terrorist attacks by the groups appear as a mirror; the rise of the terrorist attacks by
SPIS coincided by a decline of terrorist attacks of the other groups. This can confirm the
argument that SPIS was able to make alliance with all other local groups in North Sinai except
for ‘Morabteen group’. Thus, this does not reflect solely the strength of SPIS, but it also reflects
the level of armament and monetary support that were received from the IS terrorist group.
The support of IS to SPIS seems logical as currently Egypt’s battle against the Islamic
State is considered one of the main pillars of Egyptian foreign policy with the US, EU, and
Russia. In 2014, Egypt signed Jeddah Communiqué in 2014 to support the US in its fight
against the IS group (Joya, & Gormus, 2015, p. 51). The US Secretary of State John Kerry said,
“Egypt has a key role to play in countering Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria” (“Egypt
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has key role in fight against Islamic State”, 2014). Therefore, the Egyptian leading role in the
counter terrorism campaign against the IS group has escalated the tension between the IS and
Egypt, and resulted in the increase of the terrorism intensity in North Sinai province.
Figure 16 - Percentage of Attacks by Extremist Militant Groups (2013-2015)
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The Middle East regional security crisis has created the most suitable environment to
achieve the IS goal, which is the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate. This regional security
crisis has a direct impact on flourishing the extremist militant groups and operating in North
Sinai. The external interference primarily appeared in SPIS, which has become a symbol for the
transitional terrorism in North Sinai. The application of SPIS to the regional radical discourse
facilitated getting foreign fighters and financial support from the IS group. Thus, it seems that
the seeds of North Sinai terrorism might be local, but the expansion and escalation of terrorism
in North Sinai have been reinforced by the regional determinate.
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Figure 17 - External Influence and Regional Dimension
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As it is summarized in figure 17, it can be concluded from this section that the weakness
of state penetration into society, weakness of monopoly on the use of force, and weakness of
control over borders have eased the external interference by different non-state actors.
However, Israel does not conduct terrorist attacks against Egypt, but its external influence
through Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty affected negatively on Egypt’s monopoly on the use
force; in return, opened the floor for other extremist actors from Gaza Strip to interfere and fill
the power vacuum. Significantly, the Middle East regional security crisis has escalated the
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nature and intensity of terrorism in North Sinai province through the flow of weapon, militants
and institutional linkage of SPIS group to the IS.
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Chapter Five: Summary of Findings
The key finding of this study shows the correlation between the ungovernability
dimensions and terrorism phenomena in North Sinai province. The principal reason behind the
rise of terror post 2011 and 2013 is that North Sinai has been selectively governed space,
through state repression; this caused repressions on monopoly on the use of force, control over
borders, and external interference. As it is shown in below figure 18 that summarizes the
principle findings of this study, it is recognized that the ungovernability dimensions are like a
chain, in which the weakness of one dimension erodes the strength of the other three
dimensions. Remarkably, the state penetration into society is the focal ungovernability
dimension that affects the other three dimensions. Therefore, the ungovernability explains the
emergence of terrorism in North Sinai.
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Figure 18 - The Explanatory Analytical Framework of the Ungovernability – Terrorism
Nexus (EAFUTN)
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To a large extent, the study found that North Sinai province meets the ungovernability
dimensions and their nexus to the terrorism phenomena in the province. First, there was lack of
state penetration into North Society due to weakness of the physical presence of the state in
North Sinai. This last one has caused both relative deprivation among Bedouins and prevalence
of underground tunnels between Gaza Strip and North Sinai. Additionally, the absence of strong
state legitimacy authority has caused more social and cultural resistance to penetration by state
institutions, in favor of other social institutions. Historically, the legitimate social institution
was resembled in the hands of tribal leaders and Urf law, but recently, it was eroded and
replaced by the new smugglers tribal elite, those who possess the monetary and weaponry
power; in addition to rise of non-state Sharia courts legitimacy as a result of decline of Urf law
as it is perceived to be corrupt. Therefore, the erosion of both state and tribal leaders’ legitimacy
has opened the floor for the new smuggler elite and extremist militant group to gain sort of
power and legitimacy.
Based on the evidence that presented in this study, it is found that the probability of
terrorists attacks increases when the population is relatively deprived, and the state penetrates
selectively through instruments of state repression. Towards the end of controlling the region at
hand, the state uses state repression after its failure to offset the social and cultural resistance,
establish health economy, and maintain a functional infrastructure. When comparing North
Sinai to the reset of the Egyptian regions, it is noticed that relative deprivation is prevalent all
over the country, while violence is not mainly sustained as the case of North Sinai where state
repression is used at very high level. The state does not have the capacity to penetrate through
achieving socio-economic development that pushes it to penetrate selectively through state
repression. Notably, post July 2013, the relation between the selective state penetration into
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society and the citizens’ use of violence becomes cyclical, as the escalation in each one leads to
the other. Therefore, the combination of social, economic and political deprivation,
accompanied by selective state penetration, caused a radicalization that has resulted in terrorism
in North Sinai province.
Second, there was a weakness of monopoly on use the force due to the restrictions of
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty 1979, that allowed the flourishing of more than fifteen extremist
militant groups, opened the floor for Bedouins to access weapons, and created an opportunity
for cooperation between the smuggler networks and extremist militant groups as both share
common interests in arms smuggling.
Third, the weakness of both state penetration into society and monopoly on the use of
force had facilitated the lack of control over borders. The border fragility appeared in
developing roughly 1,900 underground tunnels between North Sinai and Gaza Strip in the
periods of 2007-2013. Thus, the borderland fragility allowed the flow of many extremist
militants and weapons that increased the level of ungovernability and facilitated the
proliferation of the radical ideologies and terrorism.
Fourth, the weakness of state penetration into society, weakness of monopoly on the use
of force, and lack of control over borders eased the external interference by non-state actors
who successfully gained ideological, economic, and military leverage in North Sinai. However,
the external interference occurs due to the weakness of those three dimensions, but it requires
conflict borderland countries, unstable regional condition or both as in the case of North Sinai
that affected by Gaza Strip as a conflict borderland as well as the regional security crisis in the
Middle East posts the Arab Spring. Remarkably, the external interference has escalated the
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terror and caused a transition in the nature and intensity of terror, in which transformed the
terrorism from being local into transitional one.
Based upon the case of terrorism in North Sinai post 2011 and 2013, this study
introduces the explanatory analytical framework of the nexus between the ungovernability
dimensions and terrorism (see figure 18) that can potentially be examined in other case studies.
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Chapter Six: Policy Recommendations
Based on the findings, this study proposes four policy recommendations to enforce state
penetration into society, achieve monopoly on the use of force, effectively control over borders,
and evade the external interference. As it is shown in figure 19, these four dimensions are
interdependent, and shall be considered simultaneous with a special focus on the state
penetration into society that is considered the focal dimension of the ungovernability.

Figure 19 - Policy Recommendations for the Ungovernability Dimensions

State Penetartion into
Society
Monopoly on
the Use of
Force

Control over
Borders

Prevention of
External
Interference

6.1: Reinforcement of the State Penetration into Society
Promoting the Physical Presence of the State to Reinforce the State
Legitimacy, Combat the Underground Economy and Decrease the Social and
Cultural Resistance by Population : the only remedy to reinforce the state legitimacy,
combat the underground economy and decrease the social and cultural resistance is the
reinforcement of the physical presence of the state through establishing a sustainable socioeconomic development as a sustainable remedy for the ungovernability in North Sinai.
However, there was a plan to conduct socio-economic development, but there have been always
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issues in the implementation process. This socio-economic development can be constituted by
launching projects in the areas of health, education, and infrastructure that would be able to
provide adequate urban life for Bedouins. It is vital for the state to provide urban transportation
facilities such as railways that would decrease the ungovernability through increasing the
mobility within society and connect the Sinai region to the rest of other Nile Valley provinces
and encourage other Egyptians to migrate to Sinai. Most notably, the security measures related
to development of North Sinai and landownership issue of investors were considered one of the
most important factors that contributed to lack of physical presence of the state. Therefore, the
development shall not be only limited to state-led development or military-led development, but
is important for the state to invite the private sector and international development agencies in
order to provide funding and restrict the monopoly that can lead to inefficiency of development.
As Sinai Peninsula has a geo-strategic location between African, Asia, and European
continents, the government could consider establishing ‘Sinai Industrial Zone’, which would
help to achieve socio-economic development in the Sinai Peninsula. Significantly, this would be
hard to be realized, unless the state started to de-securitize the investment process by the private
sector in Sinai
Facing

Relative

Deprivation

and

Social -Cultural

Resistance

by

Urbanization of the Bedouins Lifestyle: unlike the recommendations that show the
importance of integrating the Bedouins into society, meanwhile maintaining their culture and
lifestyle; this study found that the only way out to integrate the Bedouins into society is to
urbanize their lifestyles, thus they can be integrated smoothly into society. Undoubtedly, this
requires comprehensive inclusion policy such as allowing them to attain positions in
governmental institutions such in the military and police. For the sake of beating the
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decentralization issues and increase the feeling of integration, the government can invite the
actual local and grassroots (Bedouins) in planning and implementation of the development
process. The urbanization and inclusion of Bedouins through the aforementioned socioeconomic development could reduce the feeling of relative deprivation, increase the state
legitimacy, and decrease the social and cultural resistance of Sinai Bedouins to the state
institutions.
Promoting the State Political Capacity to Replace the other Social
Institutions: it is vital for the state to promote its political capacity through holding the
monopoly on enforcing the rule of law among the population in North Sinai. One of the main
state mistakes, which it was conducting proxy governance through tribal leaders, and when the
legitimacy of those tribal leaders has eroded, the whole governance system collapsed. Thus, the
state legitimacy should surpass the tribal leaders’ legitimacy. Moreover, combating Sharia
courts solely by force would not be sufficient, but the state shall primarily fight the radical
ideologies.
Therefore, increasing the state political capacity in enforcing the rule of law totally
depends upon the degree of the state’s willingness to promote its physical presence and conduct
socio-economic development in North Sinai province.

6.2: Reinforcement of the State Monopoly on the Use of Force
Expanding the Military Operations is conditioned by Adhering to the
International Humanitarian Law: it is vital for the military to continue expanding the
military operations in North Sinai, but in consideration of the human safety of local citizens.
Significantly, it is extremely crucial for the military to get trained on the tactics and strategies of
guerrilla warfare, which is different from traditional war. If it is needed, it is vital to think about
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expanding the Sinai-Gaza buffer zone with considering the sufficient compensation of Rafah
inhabitants this can allow them to attain an adequate housing in Al-Arish city. As the military is
in need for the Bedouins collaboration in discovering the spots of militants, the state shall
provide those Bedouins with the adequate security measures that can prevent any assassination
incidence for those Bedouins by the extremist militant groups; otherwise, the Bedouins would
fear assisting the military.
Combating not Solely the Presence of Extremist Militant Group, but also the
Causes of their Expansion: as it is explained that the SPIS is the most sustained militant
group among the fifteen militant groups as a result of receiving both weaponry and logistically
support from the IS group; thus, the state shall combat their sources of funding and logistical
support. Moreover, as it is found that many of the youth Bedouins join these extremist militant
groups due to the feeling of relative deprivation and state repression; accordingly, the state
could address this issue by enhancing the physical presence of the state through socio-economic
development and inclusion policy that previously explained.
Amending Peace Treaty of 1979 between Egypt and Israel: however, the
military has been operating freely in Zone C since the rise of terror, but this is considered a
temporary informal diplomatic agreement. The security environment during the 1970s is
roughly different from present. The Egyptian government could consider revising the peace
treaty for amendments in order to increase the military deployment in the Sinai. Previously,
after the ouster of President Mubarak, Egypt proposed to amend the Egyptian-Israeli Peace
Treaty, but this proposal was rejected by Israel (Kahn, 2013). Jimmy Carter acknowledged the
right of Egypt to amend the Peace Treaty to protect its national security (El-Nagar, 2012). The
Egyptian government could illustrate to the Israeli side that it is quite hard to contain the
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terrorist threats in North Sinai due to the restrictions of the Peace Treaty. Egypt can convince
both the US and Israeli sides that amending the Peace Treaty would not pose any threat to
Israeli; on the contrary, it would foster the Israeli security as some of those extremist militant
groups target Israel from North Sinai.
Disarmament of Bedouins: for the sake of restoring monopoly on the use of force in
the region, the disarmament of Bedouins is a condition; meanwhile strengthen the civil police
capacity to achieve adequate civilian protection for the Bedouins.

6.3: Reinforcement of the Control over Borders
Increasing the Cooperation with the Neighboring Border Countries: however,
the Egyptian state successfully conducts intelligence cooperation with Israel, but this is not the
case with Hamas. It is a problematic to seize control over North Sinai and prevent the flow of
weaponry, terrorist monetary, and above all prevent the movements of extremist militants
through Sinai-Gaza borders without coordination with Hamas. Primarily, the coordination with
Hamas requires changing of the current Egyptian perspective of considering Hamas as an
extension of Muslim Brotherhood to a vital authority needed to achieve border authority. As it
is almost impossible to impede the phenomena of underground tunnels, as long as there is a
needy population for those tunnels; therefore, the level of cooperation between Hamas and
Egypt is depended on addressing the issue of Gaza blockade. This could be addressed through
establishing free trade area between Sinai and Gaza, conditioned by reintroduction of the
Palestinian Authority into Gaza Strip in form of shared authority between both Hamas and
Fatah.
Improving Technology and Safety of Egyptian Borders: It is important for the
Egyptian military to ensure operating the latest technology that is used for the border
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monitoring, especially at the eastern border in Sinai and the western border with Libya, in
which both are considered the main sources of arms smuggling.

6.4: Remedies for External Interference
Fostering the Middle East Regional Security Architect: the state penetration
into society, monopoly on the use of force, and control over borders might decrease the
possibility of external interference, but it cannot eliminate it, especially in the Middle East
region that has been witnessing an escalation of terrorism since 2013 as a result of emergence
the IS group. Hence, fostering the Middle East regional security architect is required to address
the terrorism issue, especially in the ungoverned spaces in the Middle East region. This
coordination could be conducted by institutional means through regional organization or
informal means by regional security dialogues. The League of Arab States (LAS) seems
ineffective and outdated in fostering Middle East regional security architect, but the Union for
the Mediterranean (UfM) organization could be a potential organization in taking a lead that
includes 43 member states (European and Middle East countries), who are affected by the
ungoverned spaces in the Middle East. From regional security perspective, the UfM could
launch different counter terrorism programs such as the programs that combat terrorists’ sources
of funding as well as border security programs that prevent the flow of weapons and militants
across borders. From regional development perspective, the UfM could develop these
ungoverned spaces through establishing urban infrastructure projects that would connect these
ungoverned spaces to the different regions as well would enhance the level mobility and flow of
trade and investment in these spaces.
Investing Further in the Middle East Conflict Resolution and State Building
Processes: doubtless, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the emergence of failed states such as
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Syria, Libya, and Yemen are considered principle sources of terrorism production in the Middle
East. Therefore, it is crucial for Egypt to invest more endeavors in the conflict resolution and
state building processes.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion
The objective of this study to analyze why has terrorism escalated so dramatically in
Egypt’s North Sinai province after 2011 and 2013? but additionally to humbly fill a gap in the
literature through developing an analytical explanatory framework of the nexus between
ungovernability dimensions and terrorism.
Initially, this study attempted to answer the research question through the existing
literature on the causal factors of terrorism that included poverty, political repression,
transitional democracy, relative deprivation, clash of civilization, ungoverned spaces, and
contagion theory. The conclusion from literature indicates that ungovernability and relative
deprivation could be the most relevant analytical factors of terrorism for the case study of North
Sinai, but there is a gap in the literature in analyzing the process of the how the ungovernability
dimensions and relative deprivation can produce terrorism. Through analyzing the case of North
Sinai, this study developed an explanatory analytical framework of the nexus between the
ungovernability and terrorism.
The only limitation faced this study is that it was almost impossible to conduct a field
study in the Northern Sinai due to the security situation of the region that is currently
characterized by a ‘war zone’. The study tried to overcome this limitation by conducting twenty
interviews with North Sinai Bedouins, high ranks of security and governmental officials,
journalists who previously reported from North Sinai, ex-radical Islamist, and Egyptian and
non-Egyptian academicians and researchers’ experts in field.
Through employing the different indicators of ungovernability dimensions, relative
deprivation theory, and state repression concept, the study developed an analytical explanatory
framework of the nexus between the ungovernability dimensions and terrorism as it is
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summarized in figure 18. This figure explains that the ungovernability seems as a chain, in
which the fragility of one dimension causes fragility in the other dimensions. The principal
dimension that affects the other three dimensions is lack of state penetration into society.
Specifically, the main reasons of terrorism emergence in North Sinai are the weakness and
selective state penetration into society, weakness of monopoly on the use of force, and lack of
control over borders. The state selectively penetrates into society through state repression. The
feeling of relative deprivation and state repression led to radicalization of many youth that
translated into terror against the state. The fragility of these dimensions smoothly opened the
door for the external interference that led to escalation of terrorism in North Sinai. Therefore,
this study enriches the existing literature on ungovernability through introducing an explanatory
analytical framework on how the governability dimensions produce terrorism by adding the
concepts of selective state penetration into society and relative deprivation theory to
ungovernability dimensions.
Related to future research, this study proposes additional angles for future research.
Primarily, for the sake of generalizing the analytical explanatory framework of the nexus
between ungovernability and terrorism; future research is required to apply this developed
model on at least five ungoverned spaces/marginalized borderlands in five different regions that
experience the terror phenomenon. Moreover, further research is needed to explain the stages of
radicalization as well as the methods that are used by the extremist militant groups to recruit the
relatively deprived and repressed youth. Last but not least, since the counter terrorism campaign
might produce more terror, a future study is needed on the figuring at the successful
mechanisms of launching effective counter campaign terrorism in a marginalized borderland
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that can ensure combating the terrorism effectively, while keep promoting the human security
of inhabitants to evade any production of terror.
Finally, this study proposes four prolonged policy recommendations to reinforce the
level of governability in North Sinai province. It is essential to promote the physical presence of
the state and urbanize the Bedouins lifestyle to reinforce the state legitimacy, to combat the
underground tunnels and to decrease the social and cultural resistance by population, and to
decrease the feeling of relative deprivation. Moreover, amending Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty;
promoting the state political capacity; and expanding the military operations that are adhered to
the international humanitarian law can reinforce the state monopoly on the use of force.
Additionally, the state can effectively control borders by increasing cooperation with the Israel
and Hamas as well as by improving technology and safety of Egyptian borders. Lastly, Egypt
cannot evade the external interference by reinforcing state penetration into society, the
monopoly on the use of force, control over borders solely, but it is imperative to foster the
Middle East regional security architect through coordination with regional actors; in addition, it
is vital to invest further in the Middle East conflict resolution and state building processes.
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Appendix A: List of Interviewees
Name

Date and Place of the Personal

Title

communication
A Female Human Rights

Personal communication via email,

A Female Human Rights Activist and

Activist and Resident in North

November 30, 2016

Resident in North Sinai

Personal interview, November 25,

Prominent Middle East expert

Sinai
Abdallah Schleifer

2015 – Cairo, Egypt
Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat

Personal interview, November 29,

Professor of National Security &

2015 - Cairo, Egypt)

Dean of the Faculty of Economics
and Political Science at Future
University in Egypt (FUE)

Ahmed Sakr

Anonymous

Personal communication via Viber,

Former Head Assistant of the Sinai

November 11, 2015

Development Authority

Personal interview, February 6, 2016 –

A Former Governor of North Sinai

Cairo, Egypt

and A Former Commander of the
Egyptian Border Guards Force

Anonymous

Personal interview, March 13, 2016 -

A Former Deputy Head of the

Cairo, Egypt)

Egyptian Intelligence Directorate and
the Political Advisor for the head of
The Egyptian Cabinet Information
and Decision Support Center

Anonymous Bedouin

Personal interview, February 4, 2016 –

A Bedouin teacher from Al-Sawarka

Giza, Egypt

tribe and a prominent member in a
developmental NGO based in North
Sinai

Personal interview, February 4, 2016 –

A prominent member of AL-Sawarka

Giza, Egypt

tribe

Anonymous EX-Radical

Personal interview- November 30,

Anonymous EX-Radical Islamist and

Islamist and Researcher

2015– Giza, Egypt

Researcher specialized in the Islam

Anonymous Bedouin

specialized in the Islam

Militant Movements, personal

Militant Movements

communication
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Anonymous Political

Personal interview, February 3, 2016 -

Anonymous political researcher

Researcher Specialized in

Cairo, Egypt

specialized in security studies

Personal interview, December 1, 2015

Researcher at Al-Ahram Centre for

- Cairo, Egypt)

Political and Strategic studies

(Personal interview-December 1, 2015

Assistant Editor-in-Chief of Al-

- Cairo, Egypt)

Ahram Weekly and official

Security Studies
Iman Ragb

Khaled Dawoud

Spokesman of social-liberal AlDostour Party
Mohamed Salah

Olfa Al-Salami

Personal interview, November 30,

Head of Al-Hayat Newspaper Office

2015 – Cairo, Egypt)

in Cairo

Personal interview - November 28,

Senior Journalist who Reported from

2015 – Cairo, Egypt

and interviewed Bedouins and
smugglers in North Sinai

Robert Springborg

Salah El-Din Hassan

Sally Issac

Personal communication via Skype -

Professor of National Security at

February 8, 2016)

King’s College and Sciences Po

Personal interview- November 30,

Researcher specialized in the Islam

2015– Giza, Egypt

Militant Movements in Sinai

Personal interview, December 8, 2015

Associate Professor of Political

- Giza, Egypt

Science in Faculty of Economics and
Political Science at Cairo University

Thabet Awaad

Personal interview- December 3,

Former Arish Resident in Al-Arish

2015– Giza, Egypt

and Former Deputy Editor-in-Chief
of Al-Ahram Newspaper

Youssef Werdany

Zack Gold

Personal interview February 3, 2015–

Deputy Minister of Youth and

Cairo, Egypt

Specialist in Youth Radicalization

Personal communication via Skype via

Political Researcher Specialized in

Skype -December 2, 2015
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Appendix B: Interview Questions Guide
1. Why escalation of terrorism has been so severe in Egypt’s North Sinai province post 2011 revolution?
And why the Islamic jihadist groups are operating in North Sinai specifically?
2. Do you categorize terrorism in North Sinai as a domestic or transnational terrorism?
3. Do you consider the Jihadist militant groups in North Sinai as insurgent groups?
4. How do you evaluate/perceive the state capacity or the physical state presence to provide the basic
needs for population in North Sinai province?
5. How do you see the state legitimacy in North Sinai in comparison to the tribal system and non-state
Sharia courts?
6. Why the Jihadism ideology expanded in Egypt’s north Sinai province?
7. Do you think that relative deprivation caused radicalization in North Sinai?
8. How do you assess the Egyptian state capacity to control the expansion of jihadist militant groups in
North Sinai province?
9. How Egypt-Israel Peace treaty in 1979 impacted on the flourish the jihadist militant groups in North
Sinai?
10. How the lack of state control over the borders between Sinai and Gaza contributed to the emergence
of terrorism in North Sinai?
11. Is there any relationship between the terrorism in North Sinai and actors in Gaza Strip like Hamas or
jihadist militant groups that are based in Gaza?
12. How the underground tunnels between Sinai and Gaza helped the Jihadist militant groups in their
terrorist operations? And why the state left all these underground tunnels to grow to that extent?
13. Why terrorist attacks in North Sinai province took place under three different political systems? And
why terrorism increased especially after the ouster of president Mohamed Morsi, however the Muslim
Brotherhood denied any connection with these kinds of terrorist attacks?
14. How the increase in level of insecurity in the Middle East after the eruption of the Arab Spring
revolutions and the rise of extremist’ Islamic militant movements such as the Islamic State group (IS)
related to the terrorism in North Sinai?
15. Do the jihadist militant movements in North Sinai receive inputs or funding from the Islamic State
group (IS)?
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